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DOJ'S ATTACK ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL
"LENIENCY," THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE,
AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Susan R. Klein*
Sandra Guerra Thompson**
The last few years have brought some equilibrium to the power struggle in the federal
system between prosecutors, judges, and Congress' over criminal sentencing. It has been a
turbulent ride, and, while we're still moving, we seem to be slowing down. In this piece, we
detail the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") attempt to stamp out every vestige of judicial
leniency at federal sentencing and the Supreme Court's subsequent strike back.2  It is
primarily, though not exclusively, a federal story as of course the Court's response, handed
down in the form of constitutional rulings, binds the states as well as the federal
government. Though pieces of the story have been shared and various Supreme Court
sentencing cases analyzed, our unique contribution is to explain how and why a true
sentencing reform movement that began in the mid-1980's was co-opted by conservative
politics at the federal level at the turn of this century, thereby eliminating one avenue of
change entirely for all federal and state actors.
* Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. Thanks to Yuridia
Caire for her outstanding research assistance.
** University of Houston Law Foundation Professor of Law and Criminal Justice Institute Director,
University of Houston Law Center.
1. We purposefully do not mention juries here, as juries by and large hold no authority in sentencing matters.
Except in those few states that practice jury sentencing (like our home state of Texas), the vast majority of
jurisdictions practice judicial sentencing, both before and after the BlakelylBooker revolution. Even in those
jurisdictions that responded to the Court's Sixth Amendment cases by sending facts that trigger higher statutory
maximum sentences to the jury, the jury's power is limited to finding facts, not determining sentences.
2. Elsewhere, one of us has given the historical account of the evolution of criminal sentencing from the
colonial English practice of fixed judicial sentencing for felonies depending upon the indictment listing the "essential
elements" of the crime, to the American practice of indeterminate judicial sentencing within very wide statutory
ranges based upon pure judicial discretion, to the more recent federal practice of determinate sentencing based upon
judicial findings of those particular facts thought relevant by Congress. Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal
Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 693, 696-719 (2005). One of us has also addressed
the impact on federal sentencing of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Booker v. United States. Sandra
Guerra Thompson, The Booker Project: The Future of Federal Sentencing, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 269 (2006). We have
also described the doctrine surrounding the Supreme Court's seemingly sudden determination that over two decades
of federal sentencing practice, designed to cabin judicial discretion and foster judicial transparency in decision-
making, in fact violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and can only be cured by additional
judicial discretion. Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 Cardozo L.
Rev. 775 (2008).
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Part I belongs to "Main Justice." 3 It was during the early days of George W. Bush's
administration that the Department of Justice began its all-out assault on the federal
judiciary's sentencing powers as part of a campaign to consolidate central authority and to
require the harshest possible sentences for all federal convictions. While it had become
commonplace for members of Congress to campaign on a platform advocating harsh
punishment for criminals, this time it was the Department of Justice under Attorney General
Ashcroft seeking harsher penalties, and not just harsher-the harshest.4 DOJ's campaign
was played out in numerous arenas at the same time: (1) in Congress, where DOJ urged the
adoption of laws addressing the "problem of leniency" of district court judges; (2) before the
U.S. Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), which DOJ chided for not doing enough
about the leniency problem; and (3) even among its own field offices by attempting to
virtually eliminate the traditional charging discretion exercised by prosecutors and instead
mandating that all federal prosecutors bring the most serious charges provable. Eventually,
as the straw that broke the Court's back, the Department succeeded in prompting Congress
to enact the Feeney Amendment, a piece of legislation that was viewed as a frontal assault
on the discretion of federal judges in sentencing.
Though the show is far from over, the Supreme Court regained the upper hand over
both DOJ and Congress. As we explain in Part 1I, the judiciary regained much of its
sentencing authority by trumping Congress's legislation (and DOJ's political agenda) on
constitutional grounds. The Court upheld the overall constitutionality of the federal
sentencing system but only on the condition that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") be applied in a purely advisory manner, subject to extremely weak appellate
review for "reasonableness." 5 The case was decided on constitutional grounds that were
actually unrelated to whether or not district court judges should have the power to reduce
sentences, but the reason was neither here nor there. The outcome of the ruling was the
same: the Supreme Court gave the power over sentencing that Congress had transferred to
DOJ back to sentencing judges. The Court reaffinmed that position in a series of additional
Sixth Amendment cases decided in the October 2007 and 2008 Terms: Gall v. United
States,6 Kimbrough v. United States,7 (both heard in the October 2007 Term) and Spears v.
United States,8 (heard in the October 2008 Term) firmed federal district judge discretion
through rigid limits on appellate reversals.
The Court appeared, sensibly in our view, far less concerned with the effects of its
opinions on state criminal justice systems. Probably because most states don't have
3. This is the not always respectful designation of the Attorney General, other political appointees, and trial
attorneys working on Pennsylvania Ave. and other downtown D.C. locations as distinguished from the 94 U.S.
Attorney's Offices located throughout the United States.
4. Ironically, for over a decade, numerous scholars and federal judges had decried the harshness of
punishments that were required under federal law. Especially as compared to most state laws, federal sentences
were considered by many to be draconian, inconsistent with rational sentencing policy, and a wasteful use of
correctional resources.
5. Close to half of the states had followed the federal model post-1984 and enacted some form of guidelines.
States were likewise given the choice, by the Court, of advisory guidelines that permitted judicial discretion or
mandatory guidelines that require jury findings on all facts that increase sentences.
6. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
7. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
8. 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009).
[Vol. 44:519
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 44 [2008], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol44/iss3/4
FUTURE OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING
mandatory sentencing guideline systems or presumptive sentencing systems, those states
that do build more judicial flexibility in their systems, and state legislators are not at war
with their judiciary, so the Court's new constitutional rulings in fact had significantly less
effect on state than on federal sentencing. This is not to say, as we note in Part III, that the
Court entirely ignored the states; two recalcitrant states were pointedly reminded of the
BlakelylBooker rule,9 and the Court in its most recent sentencing decision, Oregon v. Ice,
10
(heard in the October 2008 Term) granted state trial judges even more discretion through the
practice of imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple offenses.
As a result of the last few terms, many of the recent victories that the Department
enjoyed in the political arena it lost in the courts. Under the administration of Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales, the Department continued its push for more stringent
punishments, but changes in circumstances required a new approach. Congress considered
and rejected new legislation that might constitutionally replicate DOJ's earlier coup. When
DOJ's Republican allies in Congress lost their majority position after the 2006 elections, the
push for harsher punishments slowed considerably. We expect Attorney General Eric
Holder to back away from harsh sentencing laws and tight control over Assistant United
States Attorneys ("AUSA") in the field. We have recently seen federal district judges
sentence below the range provided in the Guidelines with rising frequency, yet not ignore
the Guidelines. Though states judges never suffered in the same manner, we expect state
legislators to react to the new constitutional requirement by increasing state judicial
discretion in sentencing through advisory, rather than mandatory guidelines, and expanding
judicial authority to "stack" sentences.
I. FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM: 1984 TO 2003
The story began in 1984 when the Sentencing Reform Act transformed federal
sentencing from a purely discretionary process into a structured, mandatory one. The
move to structured sentencing also created the United States Sentencing Commission,
the administrative body that wrote the 1987 Guidelines. It now has the job of updating
them and conducting empirical research into how they are working.
1 1
The movement toward structured sentencing happened to coincide with a "get tough"
approach in Congress. Congress moved in two directions at once. On the one hand,
Congress asked the Commission to devise mandatory guidelines for sentencing to promote
fairness goals like "uniformity" (similar punishment for similar crimes). Experience
revealed that the broad judicial discretion in indeterminate sentencing regimes on both the
state and federal levels resulted in unwarranted disparities in sentencing similarly situated
defendants, with such factors as geography, race, gender, socioeconomic status, and judicial
philosophy accounting for much of the difference. "This welter of empirical data by
researchers led to a rallying cry of conservative and liberal judges and policymakers behind
9. California and Michigan in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) and McCuller v. Michigan, 549
U.S. 1197 (2007); infra nn. 147-51.
10. 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009).
11. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987. See U.S. Senten. Commn.,
2007 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2007) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/GL2007.pdf).
2009]
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Judge Marvin Frankel, the father of the modem sentencing movement."' 12 This led in turn
to published Guidelines with transparent sentences and mandatory appellate review for
conformity with the Guidelines. 
13
On the other hand, a few years earlier, Congress enacted stiff mandatory minimum
and sometimes consecutive punishments for crimes like drugs, immigration, and firearms
offenses, and began implementing "three strikes" laws against repeat offenders. 14  Of
necessity, the Commission then incorporated the mandatory minimums in setting the
sentencing ranges within the Guidelines. One effect was to tie the Commission's hands
in setting appropriate punishments for entire categories of offenses for which Congress
had created mandatory minimum sentences. The more serious effect was to create a new
mandatory sentencing system that provided for extremely harsh punishments, especially
compared with similar offenses at the state level.
The harshness of the new sentencing regime meant that, as a practical matter,
rehabilitation was no longer a serious goal of federal sentencing. 15  Parole was
eliminated. 16 It was now possible to calculate to the day when a federal inmate would be
released (assuming he or she behaved well). Rehabilitative efforts in prison would count
for nothing-new sentencing laws aimed instead simply to incapacitate offenders. Since
the guidelines went into effect in 1987, judges who oversee jury trials or who accept
guilty pleas must apply them--"guidelines" are actually "mandatory rules." Judges must
make a series of factual findings and perform a series of mathematical calculations to
determine an offender's punishment.
The defendant's sentence is determined by his place on a 258-box sentencing grid.
The defendant's place along the vertical axis, which consists of forty-three offense level
categories, is controlled primarily by the particular offense(s) the prosecutor charged in
the indictment--each federal criminal offense is assigned an offense level by the
Sentencing Guideline Manual. The judge can then adjust this offense level upward or
downward by making factual findings on those aggravating and mitigating circumstances
deemed relevant by the Sentencing Commission and listed in the Manual. 17  These
factors almost exclusively concern the manner in which the defendant committed the
12. Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 S. Ct. Rev. 223,
229-30.
13. The Sentencing Guidelines were passed as part of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Curiously, this was co-
sponsored by Senator Thurmond (who wanted harsher penalties) and Sen. Edward Kennedy, who bemoaned
sentencing disparity.
14. See U.S. Senten. Commn., Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal
Criminal Justice System Is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform, 17 Fed. Senten. Rep. 269,270-72 (2005).
15. The Sentencing Reform Act "rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation, and it states that
punishment should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitation goals." Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S.
361, 367 (1989) (citations omitted). The Senate Report accompanying the Sentencing Reform Act castigated the
"'outmoded rehabilitation model' for federal criminal sentencing, and recognized that the efforts of the criminal
justice system to achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed." Id. at 366 (citing Sen. Rep. 98-225 at 38 (Aug. 4,
1983)).
16. Federal prisoners were required to serve all of their time with the possibility of only a 15 percent reduction
for good behavior in prison.
17. U.S. Senten. Commn., 2008 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2008) (available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2008guid/GL2008.pdf) (The Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines were submitted to
Congress May I, 2009 and will be effective Nov. 1, 2009. The Amendments are available at http://www.ussc.gov/
2009guid/finalamend09.pdf).
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crime and conducted himself during the trial, and the characteristics of the victim. The
judge makes these factual findings at an informal sentencing hearing employing a lax
preponderance-of-evidence standard of proof. The defendant's place along the
horizontal axis is determined solely by his criminal history. "Under this rather
mechanical process, the judge's discretion is limited to selecting the sentence within the
very narrow range offered by the defendant's place in the grid.' 18 The only way for a
judge to show mercy was by something called a "downward departure," a mechanism
which was frowned upon and often reversed on appeal.
Traditionally, courts had given weight to other factors relating to an offender's
background such as employment history, family circumstances, education, age, mental
and physical condition, and the like. The Guidelines, however, give little, if any, weight
to an offender's personal characteristics and history (other than criminal history). Not
surprisingly, federal judges balked at the new system. At the time that the Guidelines
went into effect, federal judges felt the sting of losing the wide discretion they once
exercised in deciding what sentence to impose. 
19
Judges also balked at the harshness of the new system. Some resigned in protest
when the Guidelines went into effect or simply refused to handle sentencing in drug
cases that carry mandatory minimum sentences. Others were outspoken in speeches and
in writing about the perceived failings of the new system of punishments. Most judges
simply applied the Guidelines faithfully, as they were required by law to do. The new
mandatory system resulted in the imposition of long prison sentences under a system that
offered federal judges little wiggle room when an offender's background seemed to call
for leniency. Predictably, the combination of the Guidelines, mandatory minimum and
consecutive penalties, the drug war, demographics, three strikes laws, and the
federalization of crime brought about a population explosion in the federal prison
system-an increase of over 600 percent since the 1980s-as more people were sent to
prison for longer periods of time.
20
Perhaps less predictably, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines shifted almost all
discretion in federal criminal sentencing from district court judges to federal prosecutors.
Conceptually, a guidelines regime might reduce unwarranted disparity and promote
transparency in sentencing decisions. 2 1  Much scholarly criticism of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines concerned particular aspects of that system and its
implementation. For example, the mandatory nature of these Guidelines shifted the
possibility of obtaining leniency from either the prosecutor (in determining what to
18. Klein & Steiker, supra n. 12, at 232 (footnote omitted).
19. See Kate Stith & Jos& A. Cabranes, Fear of.Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 5 (U. Chi.
Press 1998); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 72 (Oxford U. Press 1998) (calling the federal system "the most
controversial and disliked sentencing reform initiative in U.S. history").
20. Frank 0. Bowman, 11I, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 Colum.
L. Rev. 1315, 1328-29 (2005). See John F. Pfaff, The Myths and Realities of Correctional Severity: Evidence from
the National Corrections Reporting Program on Sentencing Practices, Fordham L. Leg. Stud. Research Paper No.
1338365 (forthcoming 2009) (available at SSRN) (noting the U.S. prison growth over the last three decades from
300,000 to 1.6 million prisoners); The Pew Ctr. on the Sts., One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008 (Feb. 2008)
(available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS-Prison08-FINAL-2-1-1-FORWEB.
pdl (noting 1 in 100 adult Americans are incarcerated).
21. As the U.S. Sentencing Commission's data confirms, it will reduce disparity in sentencing outcomes per
charged offense. It cannot account for disparity in charging and pleas or disparity in investigation.
2009]
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charge) or the judge (in determining the individualized sentence) to begging the
prosecutor. The draconian sentence lengths and possibility of charging offenses with
mandatory minimum penalties or mandatory consecutive penalties allow prosecutors to
coerce plea bargains from risk-averse defendants, and from defendants who know they
are guilty of at least some basic offense. The necessity of pleading guilty to receive an
"acceptance of responsibility" deduction, and the requirement of a government motion
before a judge can reduce a sentence below a mandatory minimum based on substantial
assistance to the government, also place inordinate power solely in the hands of the
prosecutor.
2 2
Toward the end of the Clinton Administration, there were political stirrings in
Congress that presaged a change of direction in sentencing policy. Ironically, although
federal judges had protested the Guidelines when they were adopted in 1987, the outcries
had died down by the late 1990's, possibly because judges had become inured to the
unavoidable reality of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums. But some
members in Congress saw things differently. According to their view, many federal
judges were instead not applying the Guidelines faithfully. Some legislators believed
that judges had found a way to circumvent the Guidelines by applying "downward
departures" to reduce sentences. They also took the view that the Clinton
Administration's Justice Department was complicit in this effort in not protesting and
appealing such departures. Thus, began the drive for sentencing harshness in the fall of
2000 that would gain speed with the election of President George W. Bush and would
become a principal goal of the DOJ under Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales.
Concerns about judicial leniency were first aired at a Senate subcommittee hearing
held during the height of the Presidential election campaign of 2000. Criticisms centered
on the threat to the consistent operation of the Guidelines that some saw in the steady
increase in "downward departures" by federal district court judges and the fact that "[t]he
Clinton Justice Department apparently has shown little concern about this trend toward
reduced and more inconsistent punishment."
23
District courts can grant downward departures under a number of different
circumstances. Some of the departures can be characterized as demonstrating judicial
leniency. Others are granted only upon request of the prosecutor. The term "downward
departures" refers to reductions below the sentencing range specified by the Guidelines.
Once she determines the Guidelines range for a particular offender, the Guidelines
permit the judge to "depart" from the range under certain circumstances. Departures can
be made "upward" (yielding a more severe sentence) or "downward" (yielding a more
lenient sentence). Not all downward departures represent judicial leniency, however, as
two of the three types of departures are granted by request of the prosecution for purely
22. Klein & Steiker, supra n. 12, at 235; Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking
Sentencing Justice, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 303 (2009); lan Weinstein, Fifteen Years after the Federal Sentencing
Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 87 (2003); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation,
105 Colum. L. Rev. 1010 (2005).
23. Sen. Subcomm. on Crim. Just. Oversight of the Comm. of Jud., Oversight of the United States Sentencing
Commission: Are the Guidelines Being Followed? 106th Cong. (Oct. 13, 2000), in 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 317, 317
(2003) (statement of Senator Thurmond).
[Vol. 44:51!9
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pragmatic reasons.
The largest category of downward departures, a reward for the defendant's
cooperation with the government, applies only upon request of the prosecutor. A recent
example of a "substantial assistance" departure is the government's use of Andrew
Fastow's testimony to convict Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay-the two top executives of the
Enron Corporation during the company's scandalous slide into bankruptcy.24 A second
large category of downward departures-those in immigration-related cases--emerged
during the 1990's in border districts that implemented special procedures to
accommodate the growing volume of cases. 25 Fast-track programs were instituted of
sheer necessity, and downward departures made as part of this program do not indicate
judicial or prosecutorial leniency but are again considered an unfortunate necessity.
The Guidelines create a third category of downward departures for cases in which
there exists "'an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines.' 26 The assumption underlying the Guidelines is that most cases involving a
certain offense and a certain criminal history will deserve the same range of punishment.
This group of typical cases within a certain offense and criminal history combination is
known as the "heartland" of cases, and all offenders falling within that heartland should
be sentenced within the same narrow guideline range. Consideration of other factors like
potential for rehabilitation or community service can normally be taken into account only
within the very narrow range dictated by the Guidelines. However, the provision
allowing judges to depart either upward or downward from the Guidelines range for
circumstances not adequately considered by the Commission recognizes that some
extraordinary cases will fall outside the heartland of ordinary cases. It is this third
category that provides some opportunity for judicial leniency.
In the early days of the Guidelines, district court judges tried to find some
flexibility in the Guidelines by exercising this departure power. The adoption of the
appellate review provisions of the Guidelines meant that prosecutors could challenge a
judge's application of the Guidelines by filing an appeal. Judges who granted downward
departures often found their decisions reversed by appellate courts that did not agree that
the facts or the law justified the departure. To give one example, district court judges
applying the Guidelines in the early days of their existence sought to find grounds for
reducing sentences for mothers who were solely responsible for young children at
home.27 Prosecutors often challenged these sentence reductions and, by and large, the
24. U.S. Senten. Commn., supra n. 17, at § 5K1.1. Law enforcement considers these a necessary evil to induce
"snitches" to help the government in investigating and prosecuting other criminals. A reduced sentence for a
government informant is not generally evidence of leniency-it is the cost of doing business for the government.
However, once the prosecutor makes such a request, she cannot control the extent of the departure the judge chooses
to grant.
25. The 1990s saw a rapid rise in the rate of prosecution for offenses relating to immigration, as well as drug
offenses, along the southwest border. DOJ responded by implementing measures called "fast track" programs to
expedite the processing of cases in districts with large immigration caseloads. These programs offer reduced
sentences in exchange for prompt guilty pleas, waiver of appeals, and immediate deportation of the individual.
26. U.S. Senten. Commn.,supra n. 17, at Ch. 1, Pt. A(4)(b) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
27. See Judge Nancy Germer, Women Offenders and the Sentencing Guidelines, 14 Yale J.L. & Feminism 291,
291-300 (2002).
2009]
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Circuit Courts agreed with the prosecutors. The Circuit Courts found that this basis for
departure had been taken into account by the Commission which found family
circumstances to be "not ordinarily relevant" as a ground for departure. A departure was
therefore only justified if the family circumstances were "extraordinary." The Circuit
Courts typically decided that the hardships faced by young children whose parent was
incarcerated were not sufficiently "extraordinary" to justify a downward departure.2
8
It did not take long to recognize that the critical issue in downward departure cases
was how much deference the Circuit Courts should show to District Court judges in their
sentencing decisions. In cases in which prosecutors appealed sentences that included
downward departures, defense lawyers often argued that the appellate courts should take
a hands-off approach in reviewing the propriety of downward departures. DOJ took the
opposite position. Eventually, the issue percolated up to the Court in Koon v. United
States,29 a case that gained notoriety for different reasons, but which within the world of
federal sentencing would be widely known for its impact on the district court judges'
power to grant sentence departures. The Court told the Circuit Courts of Appeal to back
off in stringently reviewing the appropriateness of departure decisions (whether upward
or downward) made by sentencing judges.30
On March 3, 1991, a group of mostly white Los Angeles police officers beat the
intoxicated Mr. King repeatedly with police batons when he refused to lie on the ground
after a high-speed automobile chase and arrest.3 1 A bystander captured most of this
incident on videotape, and it was aired repeatedly nationwide. When the state
prosecution yielded acquittals of the four officers, sparking widespread rioting, 32 federal
prosecutors stepped in with civil rights charges, and this time two of the officers were
convicted.
Federal District Court Judge John Davies sentenced Koon and Powell to 30 months
imprisonment, rather than the 70 to 87 months recommended by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, granting a five-level downward departure because "the victim's wrongful
conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior." He granted
another three-level departure based on a combination of factors: (1) the "'widespread
publicity,"' (2) that the officers would "'likely be targets of abuse' in prison," (3) that
they would now face a police inquiry that would result in their never again working as
police officers and had been subjected to multiple prosecutions, and (4) that they were
not "'violent, dangerous, or likely to engage in future criminal conduct."'
33
The government appealed the officers' sentences, challenging the validity of the
grounds for the downward departure. The DOJ (under the Clinton Administration) also
argued (as would the Bush DOJ in testimony before Congress years later) that decisions
28. U.S. Senten. Commn., supra n. 17, at § 5H 1.6; Douglas A. Berman, Addressing Why: Developing Principled
Rationales for Family-Based Departures, 13 Fed. Senten. Rep. 274 (2001) (collecting cases).
29. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 85-87; Lou Cannon, Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles
and the LAPD xix (Westview Press 1999).
32. Madison Gray, The L.A. Riot: Fifteen Years after Rodney King, http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/
la_riot/article/0,28804,1614117_1614084_1614512,00.html (last accessed May 18, 2009).
33. Koon, 518 U.S. at 89 (quoting U.S. v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 788-90 (C.D. Cal. 1993)).
[Vol. 44:519
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to depart should be reviewed on appeal on a "de novo" basis. The Supreme Court agreed
to hear the case in order to settle the important issue about how much latitude sentencing
judges should have in granting departures. In the end, the case before the Supreme Court
was less about whether the grounds for departure in the officers' cases were justified and
more about which court-the district court or court of appeals-should decide.
It is interesting to note that the DOJ at this time was headed by Janet Reno, the
Attorney General appointed by President Clinton. In later Congressional hearings, the
Clinton DOJ would be accused of failing to challenge downward departures by regularly
filing appeals. Yet in the Koon case, it was the Clinton Administration's DOJ that was
challenging the downward departures and argued for a de novo standard of appellate
review.
The preference shown by federal prosecutors of all political affiliations for a de
novo standard of appellate review does not necessarily reflect a uniform preference for
harshness. Rather, experts would see it as a preference for prosecutorial control over
sentencing. A de novo standard of appellate review gave prosecutors a second chance to
enforce the plea deal and sentencing arrangement they had negotiated with the
defendant. 34  If a District Court judge granted a downward departure despite a
prosecutor's objections, the prosecutor could appeal the case and try again with a Circuit
Court that would have broad powers to reverse the decision. Because appellate judges
are far removed from individual cases and have a stronger interest in intra-Circuit
uniformity not possessed by district judges, a prosecutor had a pretty good shot at having
a departure overturned by an appellate court. In fact, appellate courts were reversing
about three-quarters of all downward departures appealed by the government at that
time.
35
In the Koon case, defense lawyers argued that a district judge's decision to depart
should be reviewed on appeal under the more deferential "abuse of discretion" standard,
overturning a sentence only if the judge clearly erred in applying the law, and not simply
because the appeals court decides the sentence departure was not justified by the facts.
The defense emphasized the fact that appellate courts would have to weigh the merits of
factual issues based only on the "cold record" and not on any personal contact with the
defendant or other witnesses.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that district courts should have
sufficient leeway to make departure decisions for unusual cases and adopted an "abuse of
discretion" standard of appellate review. 36 The Court declared that departure decisions
34. 95 percent of federal criminal felony cases in 1995 resulted in guilty plea. In 2008, that figure rose to 97
percent. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Case Processing Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (last
updated Apr. 25, 2008). Because of this, appellate review is primarily of sentences imposed after a defendant has
plead guilty and entered into a deal-there are few appellate reviews of sentences imposed after a trial. Aside from
government sponsored downward departures for substantial assistance or the fast-track program, plea deals very
rarely include a downward departure for the defendant-that is something a district judge may do on her own or
after a request by defense counsel. A de novo standard makes it easier for the appellate court to reverse any non-
government sponsored downward departure and impose a sentence pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
35. U.S. Semen. Commn., Guideline Involved in Issues Appealed by the Government: Table 58, (2001)
(available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/table58.pdf).
36. When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), which created the Commission and set out its
charge to draft the guidelines, it did not specify the standard for appellate review (beyond review "for conformity
with the Guidelines") and neither did the Commission's guidelines. The Supreme Court was left with the task of
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should in most cases be given "substantial deference" because they embody "the
traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court."3 7 In so deciding, the Supreme
Court rejected the government's argument that departure decisions are not fact-intensive.
The Court found that sentencing courts decide whether a case falls outside of the
heartland of typical cases by making a "refined assessment of the many facts bearing on
the outcome, informed by its vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal
sentencing." 38 Not only did the Court decide that departure determinations were fact-
intensive decisions, but it also found that sentencing courts have a "'special
competence"' to decide whether a particular case is ordinary or unusual.
39
While the Supreme Court's decision put an end to these officers' legal battles, it
was the beginning of a new battle over the powers of federal judges to depart
downwards. This battle would again be resolved ultimately by the Court, though tussles
on this issue between the DOJ, Congress, and the federal judiciary continue to this day.
The United States Sentencing Commission had envisioned that departures, both
upward and downward, would be "rare" occurrences. Yet following the Koon decision
in 1996, the district courts had more latitude to exercise their discretion to depart
downwards, and some judges clearly took advantage of that new freedom. Senator
Strom Thurmond took the position that too many district court judges were finding
"more and more creative reasons" for reducing sentences. 40  Somewhat
melodramatically, William G. Otis, a former Assistant U. S. Attorney in the Eastern
District of Virginia, chided the Clinton Administration's Justice Department and the
Sentencing Commission for showing a "lack of leadership" in failing to address the
"epidemic of downward departures. ' 4 1 (Of course, this was the same Administration
that had challenged the downward departures in the Koon case and had argued for a de
novo standard of appellate review.) Unfortunately, neither Senator Thurmond nor Mr.
Otis provided statistics that broke down the total number of downward departures over
time and distinguished sentence reductions based on judicial leniency from those given
to government informants or to expedite immigration cases.
4 2
The Justice Department representative at the hearing was Laird Kirkpatrick,
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, who agreed with the assessment that "fewer
and fewer cases are being sentenced within the sentencing range dictated by the
guidelines. 'A3 He called for the Commission to seriously examine the issue, but did not
make any statement in defense of the Justice Department's role in the increase in
deciding the standard based on Congress's apparent vision of the departure power.
37. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 99 (quoting U.S. v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993)).
40. Sen. Subcomm. on Crim. Just. Oversight of the Comm. of Jud., supra n. 23, at 317.
41. Id. at 321 (statement of William G. Otis).
42. The United States Sentencing Commission now divides departures into "government-sponsored" and "non-
government sponsored" departures and further divides those two categories into additional subcategories (within the
government-sponsored category, the statistics are further broken down into substantial assistance departures, early
disposition program departures, and other below range; within the non-government sponsored category, the statistics
are additionally broken down into downward departures from the guidelines range and downward departures with
Booker). This new coding system did not occur until fiscal year 2003 and post-2005, respectively. U.S. Senten.
Commn., 2008 Annual Report 35-36 (2008) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/Chap5_08.pdf).
43. Id. (statement of Laird Kirkpatrick).
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downward departures. In the end, the hearing served to signal to observers an emerging
discontent with sentencing judges among Republicans in Congress.
Within months, George W. Bush became President, and his appointee, John
Ashcroft, took the helm at the Justice Department. Attorney General Ashcroft answered
the clarion call sent out by Senator Thurmond and took up the fight against judicial
"leniency." The Department, at least Main Justice, went from being a target of the
criticism to being the principal critic, with the target now placed squarely on the federal
district courts. 44 High-ranking DOJ officials at Main Justice began a concerted effort to
shed light on what they perceived to be the growing leniency in the way that federal
district court judges were applying the Guidelines. They urged members of Congress to
curb the power of the District Court judges by "overruling" the Koon case and adopting a
de novo standard of review, giving the Circuit Courts more power to reverse sentencing
decisions.
Representatives of the Department promoted the campaign against downward
departures by raising the subject at Congressional hearings and hearings before the
Commission, even when the hearings were not called to address issues in sentencing. In
what was clearly a coordinated effort, each DOJ representative would begin by
addressing the topic of the hearing and then change the subject to the question of
downward departures by the federal district courts.
45
DOJ also attacked the problem by proposing that the Commission severely limit
downward departures, ostensibly as a means of deterring corporate criminals. Eric Jaso,
Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General, wrote a letter to the Commission dated
October 1, 2002, reaffirming the President's commitment to holding corporate criminals
accountable for their misdeeds by enforcing tough penalties.46  As a means of
toughening penalties for corporate criminals, DOJ proposed placing severe limits on
downward departures of many types-and not just in white-collar cases. The proposed
provisions would have limited a judge's ability to take many factors into account in
departing downwards: (1) physical condition, including drug or alcohol dependence or
abuse, (2) family ties and responsibilities, and community ties, (3) military, civic,
charitable, or public service; (4) employment-related contributions; (5) record of prior
good works, (6) acceptance of responsibility and payment of restitution; (7) diminished
capacity, and (8) aberrant behavior.
The overall campaign for tougher penalties also involved efforts to increase the
punishments required by the Guidelines (in addition to the effort to force judges to
44. Many of the 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices continued to concur with local judges in granting downward
departures.
45. For example, U.S. Attorney James B. Comey testified before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime
and Drugs on June 19, 2002 in a hearing called to discuss the penalties for white-collar crime. Mr. Comey
complained that federal judges were using their departure powers "to sentence white-collar defendants to probation
rather than jail." He then launched into a general complaint about how the standard of appellate review announced
in the Koon case was "[fqurther exacerbating the problem" because it has "impaired the government's ability
successfully to challenge district court departures." He concluded that the "impact of these departures in white-
collar cases cannot be overstated." He then went on to provide several anecdotes, and statistics for downward
departures not including substantial assistance departures. Statement of US. Attorney James B. Comey before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs (June 19, 2002), 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 323, 324 (2003).
46. Ltr. from Eric H. Jaso to J. Diana E. Murphy (Oct. 1, 2002), in 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 326 (2003).
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impose sentences without departing from the Guidelines). Spurred by public outrage
over the harm caused by the defendants in the Enron fiasco, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which, in addition to creating new criminal offenses, included
directives to the Commission to increase penalties for corporate crimes.47  The
Commission held a public meeting on January 8, 2003, to consider certain proposals
designed to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.4 8  Mr. Jaso gave voice to the
Department's views that the Commission's proposal "did not go far enough in increasing
penalties."
4 9
By the spring of 2003, DOJ's efforts against downward departures had picked up
political steam with the support of hard statistical data. Associate Deputy Attorney
General Daniel P. Collins used the occasion of a Congressional hearing on crimes
affecting children and pornography to tout the Department's position on downward
departures. Unlike earlier hearings at which individuals testified without having
statistical support for their contentions, by 2003 the Department had compiled statistics
on non-substantial assistance, non-immigration downward departures. Mr. Collins
testified that the "rate of such departures [non-substantial assistance] in non-immigration
cases has climbed from 9.6% in [fiscal year] 1996 to 14.7% in [fiscal year] 2001-an
increase of over 50% in just five years."5° These figures would be repeated by other
DOJ officials testifying in other hearings during this period. He also specifically
addressed the statistics on downward departures in sexual abuse and pornography cases.
Finally, he reiterated the Department's position that "much of the damage is traceable to
the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United States."
The Department's campaign against downward departures had reached the
receptive ears of some members of Congress, including freshman Congressman Tom
Feeney, who sponsored an amendment to H.R. 1161 (later dubbed the PROTECT Act).
The bill was aimed at child abduction and sexual offenses. In what would become
known as the "Feeney Amendment," the provision advanced DOJ's agenda on
downward departures.
The bill included a highly controversial reporting requirement. It required the
Chief Judge of each district and the Commission to report to Congress and, upon request,
to the Attorney General on downward departures, including "the identity of the
sentencing judge." The requirement to provide a list of names of judges was viewed as
an attempt to intimidate federal judges by "blacklisting" those who granted downward
departures. As a final slap at the federal judiciary, the amendment reduced the number
of federal judges that were required to serve as members of the Commission from a
minimum of three to a maximum of three, meaning that under the new provision it would
be permissible to exclude judges completely!
It is no exaggeration to say the representatives of nearly every prestigious legal and
47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
48. Excerpts from Minutes of the U.S. Sentencing Commission Public Meeting (Jan. 8, 2003), 15 Fed. Senten.
Rep. 329 (2003).
49. Id. at 330.
50. Statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel P. Collins before the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security (Mar. 11, 2003), 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 331, 331 (2003).
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civil rights organization with any interest in federal criminal law -other than the Justice
Department-spoke out against the Feeney Amendment. On March 26, 2003, a joint
letter was sent to every Congressman from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, Families against Mandatory Minimums, and the American Civil
Liberties Union.5 1 The letter opposed the Feeney Amendment, warning that it would
"eviscerate a federal judge's power to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines" and "to
make the punishment fit the crime."
52
In a separate letter, the NAACP Director, Hilary 0. Shelton, wrote generally about
the "potential impact of this provision on the African American community and on
ethnic minority American communities throughout the nation is almost
incomprehensible." 53 The American Bar Association President Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.
wrote to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, on April 1,
2003 that adoption of the amendment would send "an unmistakable message that
Congress does not trust the judgment of the judges it has confirmed to office," and it
"threatens the legitimacy of the Commission . . . [which] was created by Congress to
ensure that important decisions about federal sentencing were made intelligently,
dispassionately, and, so far as possible, uninfluenced by transient political
considerations. "
54
Academics chimed in too. A group of 70 criminal law professors, many with
extensive experience in sentencing law, submitted a letter to Congress. 55  They
questioned the necessity of the Feeney Amendment, noting that in fiscal year ("FY")
2001, the Circuit Courts had reversed granted departures in more than three-quarters of
those cases in which the government decided to challenge them.
Needless to say, the federal judiciary-from the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court to the district court judges across the country-vehemently opposed the Feeney
Amendment. The Judicial Conference of the United States issued a letter to the Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch on April 3, 2003.56 This group, comprised
of federal judges, scholars, and practitioners who annually amend the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure "strongly oppose[d] several of [the Feeney Amendment] sentencing
provisions because they undermine the basic structure of the sentencing system and
impair the ability of courts to impose just and responsible sentences." The judiciary
voiced the same concern, as did other groups, regarding the "lack of careful review" and
the fear that the amendment would undercut the traditional role of the Commission. The
Judicial Conference urged Congress to await the studies of departures that were currently
51. Lir. from Leadership Conf. on Civ. Rights, Natl. Assn. of Crim. Def. Laws., Natl. Leg. Aid and Defender
Assn. Families against Mandatory Minimums & Am. Civ. Liberties Union to H.R. (Mar. 26, 2003), in 15 Fed.
Senten. Rep. 346 (2003).
52. Id. at 346.
53. Ltr. from Hilary 0. Shelton to U.S. Sen. (Apr. 10, 2003), in 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 346, 350 (2003).
54. Ltr. from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr. to Orrin G. Hatch (Apr. 1, 2003), in 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 346, 348
(2003).
55. Ltr. from L. Profs. to Senators Hatch and Leahy (April 2,2003), in 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 346, 351 (2003).
56. Ltr. from Jud. Conf. of the U.S. to Sens. Hatch and Leahy (April 3, 2003), in 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 343
(2003).
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being undertaken by the Commission before making any changes to the law. In a
separate letter, Chief Justice William Rehnquist added that the Judicial Conference
further opposed the legislation because it would alter the standard of appellate review.
The DOJ responded promptly. Through its representative Jamie Brown, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, the Department issued a letter in support of the Feeney
Amendment on April 4, 2003. This letter argued that even using the measure suggested
by the American Bar Association, downward departures increased from 5.5 percent in
FY 1991 to 13.2 percent in FY 2001, more than doubling in over ten years. 57 Mr.
Brown's letter made an emotional appeal against downward departures by highlighting a
single child pornography case in which the district court granted a departure.
In the end, the widespread criticism of the Amendment spurred Congress to scale
back some of the proposed terms. The original bill had included language that would
have prohibited departures on any ground that the Commission has not affirmatively
specified as a permissible ground for a downward departure. This provision was
restricted to departures in cases involving crimes against children. As for departures in
all other cases, the amendment provided only that the Commission would review
downward departures and make appropriate amendments to "substantially reduce" the
incidence of downward departures. The amendment also required the Attorney General
to report to Congress on all downward departures, a record-keeping task the Department
preferred not to undertake. Interestingly, the amendment also required the Attorney
General to report to Congress on the policies and procedures the Department had
undertaken to ensure that DOJ attorneys adequately challenged inappropriate downward
departures and to ensure that DOJ attorneys in the field promptly notify Main Justice of
any adverse sentencing decision. In the end, the scaled-down version of the Feeney
Amendment overwhelmingly prevailed in Congress and was signed into law by President
Bush on April 30, 2003.
Numerous federal judges vocalized strong opposition to the Feeney Amendment
once enacted. One judge, John Martin, a former United States Attorney, resigned in
public protest. As part of an apparent passive-aggressive protest against the reporting
requirements placed on federal judges, Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr., imposed a "'blanket
seal' on all documents originating in his Eastern District of New York court and
forbade Congress from examining them without his approval.58  Judge Johnson's
colleague in the Eastern District of New York, Senior District Judge Jack B. Weinstein,
decided that the de novo standard of appellate review necessitated that all sentencing
hearings be memorialized by video recordings to assist the appellate courts in "their new
onerous task of more closely supervising trial judges in minimizing departures from the
Guidelines."
59
At the appellate level, Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals noted the overt politicization of sentencing embedded in the new provisions.
His "fundamental objection" to the new system is that "it takes discretion from
57. Ltr. from Jamie E. Brown to Orrin G. Hatch (Apr. 4, 2003), in 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 355, 356 (2003).
58. Benson B. Weintraub & Benedict P. Kuehne, The Feeney Frenzy: A Case Study in Actions and Reactions in
the Politics of Sentencing, 16 Fed. Senten. Rep. 114, 115 (2003).
59. Memo. from J. Jack B. Weinstein (Jan. 30, 2004), in 16 Fed. Senten. Rep. 282, 282 (2004).
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independent courts and gives it to dependent prosecutors, who then have to answer to the
attorney general and other political figures."
60
Attorney General Ashcroft swung into action following the passage of the Feeney
Amendment. His first response was to get into compliance with the mandates of the new
law, but he would soon go much farther than that. He issued internal memoranda listing
new directives to be followed by DOJ attorneys at Main Justice and all Assistant U.S.
Attorneys nationwide.
The Feeney Amendment required DOJ to adopt procedures to ensure that DOJ
attorneys (1) oppose unsupported downward departures, (2) notify the Washington
component of the DOJ about any such "adverse sentencing decisions," and (3) "ensure
the vigorous pursuit of appropriate and meritorious appeals." 6 1 In a memorandum of
July 28, 2003, he required DOJ attorneys to oppose and appeal unsupported downward
departure decisions and to report adverse sentencing decisions to Main Justice. 62 These
requirements simply put into effect the requirements set forth in the Feeney Amendment.
In addition, Attorney General Ashcroft also required that federal prosecutors must
disclose to the judge all "readily provable facts" that are relevant to sentencing and that
prosecutors refrain from "fact bargains." Fact bargaining is a phenomenon that arose
with the adoption of tough, mandatory minimum penalties and mandatory sentencing
guidelines. In order to obtain guilty pleas, prosecutors had been known to neglect to
mention certain incriminating facts to the judge and the Probation Officer (who
calculates the Guidelines for the court) so as to keep the Guidelines calculations lower
than they otherwise would be. The Guidelines prohibited such suppression of relevant
facts as part of a plea bargain, but the practice apparently existed nonetheless. This
memorandum was therefore an attempt to enforce compliance with the Guidelines.
A few months later, the Attorney General issued new directives that, again, went
much farther than what Congress had required in the Feeney Amendment. In a
memorandum that would be known as the "Ashcroft Memorandum," dated September
22, 2003, the Attorney General mandated that federal prosecutors treat all cases as
harshly as possible. 63 The memorandum attempted to remove the vast majority of the
discretion that federal prosecutors may have once exercised in making charging and plea
bargaining decisions. The new directives from Main Justice to line attorneys in the U.S.
Attorneys offices caused great consternation both within and beyond DOJ walls. The
lion's share of federal criminal prosecutions are brought by the 94 U.S. Attorney's
Offices, not Main Justice, and this memorandum could cabin prosecutorial discretion
only to the extent that it could be enforced.
The memorandum set forth a "[g]eneral [d]uty to [c]harge and [p]ursue the [m]ost
60. Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing Commission's Response to the
Feeney Amendment, 16 Fed. Senten. Rep. 98, 98 (2003) (quoting Judge Calabresi).
61. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 674 (2003).
62. Memo. from Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft Setting Forth Justice Department's Sentencing Policies (July 28,
2003), in 15 Fed. Senten. Rep. 375, 376 (2003).
63. Memo. from Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft Setting Forth Justice Department's Charging and Plea Policies (Sept.
22, 2003), in 16 Fed. Senten. Rep. 129 (2003). This memorandum, which formally superseded the Reno
Memorandum, repeated that prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious readily provable offense, and
limited the circumstances under which local USAOs could deviate from this rule without Main Justice approval.
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[s]erious, [rjeadily [p]rovable [o]ffense in [a]ll [f]ederal [p]rosecutions. 64 The new
policy defined "serious offense" as that which would generate the most substantial
sentence under the Guidelines, so the policy was clearly part of the effort to maximize
sentencing harshness for all offenses. Of course, there is some wiggle room as to which
offenses are "readily provable" as this is a judgment call based upon the prosecutor's
view of the facts. The Ashcroft Memorandum also addressed another way in which
prosecutors could participate in reducing sentences below that which the Guidelines
require for the type of offense committed: charge bargaining. Unlike "fact bargaining,"
which involves overlooking aggravating facts so as to keep the Guidelines sentence
lower, "charge bargaining" refers to the negotiation surrounding declining or dismissing
more serious charges as part of a plea bargain. The Ashcroft Memorandum prohibited
charge bargaining if it lowered the overall sentence. It did include a small list of
exceptions to the duty to charge the most serious offense-fast-track programs,
substantial assistance, caseload issues, and other exceptional circumstances. Overall,
however, the policy was clear: Federal prosecutors were now ostensibly bound by Main
Justice policy to charge and pursue the most serious offenses that they could "readily"
prove. U.S. Attorney's Offices followed this policy to varying degrees, depending upon
the political clout of particular U.S. Attomeys and the backbone and experience of
individual Assistants.
The abrupt abolition, at least on paper, of prosecutorial charging discretion left
nearly everyone stunned, including many federal prosecutors. Former Attorney General
Janet Reno disagreed with the new policy, saying, "'To see that justice is done, there has
got to be the ability to focus on what's the right thing to do in a particular case, and the
right thing to do may not be the ultimate charge."' 6 5 The view that prosecutors should
exercise fairly broad discretion in charging so as to "do justice" had been firmly
established in the traditions of our legal system. It was so central to the essence of what
it means to be a prosecutor that the Ashcroft Memorandum arguably represented nothing
less than a fundamental shift of the federal prosecutorial role in general and the
relationship between Main Justice and the 94 branch offices in particular.
At the same time, the Commission had begun to fulfill its new obligations under
the Feeney Amendment. It eliminated certain grounds for downward departures
altogether and limited certain others. Departures that had sought to provide additional
reductions of sentence based on things such as "extraordinary" acceptance of
responsibility or a "super-minimal" role in the offense were abolished. The possibility of
departing downward based on an offender's extraordinary community ties was
eliminated, among other abolished grounds. Other common departure grounds such as
diminished capacity, aberrant behavior, and family ties and responsibilities, were scaled
back.
By the end of 2003, DOJ-with Congress's help-had managed to transfer a great
deal of sentencing authority from the district court judges to prosecutors (or at least to
64. Id. at 130.
65. See Arnie N. Ely, Student Author, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcrof
Memorandum's Curtailment of the Prosecutor's Duty to "'Seek Justice", 90 Cornell L. Rev. 237, 240 (2004)
(footnote omitted).
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Main Justice) by virtue of the Feeney Amendment. Since the judges could no longer
exercise their downward departure powers as freely, the Justice Department would be in
a position to determine the sentence to be imposed by means of the charges selected.
This preference for prosecutorial control of the disposition of criminal cases is not
unique to the Bush Administration's Justice Department. The Clinton Administration's
decision to challenge the downward departures in the Koon case and argue in favor of de
novo review of departures underscores this fact. Attorneys General appointed by both
Democratic and Republican Presidents wanted their prosecutors to have the greatest
ability possible in challenging downward departures with which they disagreed. What
sets the Bush Administration's DOJ apart, however, was the Ashcroft Memorandum's
policy of eliminating the line-prosecutor's powers to reduce sentences, when appropriate,
without Main Justice prior approval. It was this policy that demonstrates that the
Department's aim was not simply prosecutorial control over sentencing but enhancing
headquarters' control over the 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices and maximizing harshness of
punishment across the board.
This desire for punitive sanctions in all cases, controlled by prosecutorial charging
decisions, is further demonstrated by the Department's reaction to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's proposed changes to the Federal Guidelines between 1987 and 2008. To
date, over 700 amendments to the Guidelines have been promulgated. By our count, 262
of these were substantive amendments, while the others were technical, correcting, and
conforming. The overwhelming majority of these substantive amendments increased an
offense level, changed a definition in the Guidelines Manual to one more favorable to the
government, added a new enhancement, resolved a circuit split in favor of the
Department's interpretation of the Guidelines, or added a base offense level to a new
crime.66 We could find only one instance where the Department suggested a substantive
change that favored a defendant-when Attorney General Janet Reno, with the support
of President Clinton, unsuccessfully advocated reducing the crack:powder disparity in
sentencing for cocaine trafficking down from 100:1 to 5:1.67
II. THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES BACK
At the same time that the institutional struggle over sentencing power was being
fought, the Supreme Court was creating additional havoc in the sentencing world in a
series of constitutional decisions relating to the intersection between the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial and criminal penalties. While the first case in this series,
Apprendi v. New Jersey,68 concerned a state hate-crime statute, those involved knew that
a holding in favor of the defendant might be viewed as a mandate on the constitutionality
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. This initial decision announced a new
constitutional limit on the power of a legislature-whether federal or state-to require
judges, rather than juries, to find facts triggering an increase in sentences beyond what is
66. Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, Sentencing Commission and Department Response Study,
1987-2008 (unpublished ms.) (copy on file with authors).
67. Lr. from U.S. Atty. Gen. Janet Reno and Dir. of the Off. of Natil. Drug Control Policy Barry R. McCaffiey
to Pres. William Jefferson Clinton (July 3, 1997), in 10 Fed. Senten. Rep. 192 (1998).
68. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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otherwise specified for the crime. Just a few years later, the Court announced that
guidelines sentencing as it was practiced in the federal system denied individuals this
same jury right, and that the remedy was a return to having judges decide sentence
lengths under the now advisory guidelines.
69
The fact that the Court framed these cases in the context of jury findings-when in
fact there was to be no additional jury findings in the future of federal courts-was
confusing. What was really going on "behind the scenes" during the Supreme Court's
secret deliberations, or for that matter in the minds of the individual justices, remains
confidential. In our view, however, the individual justices most likely agreed to overhaul
federal sentencing at least in part because of the power struggles with Congress we
described above. This new sentencing jurisprudence came crashing down on the DOJ
and Congress's campaign to force federal judges to impose the harshest sentences
mandated by the Guidelines. Ultimately, the Court would undo much of the
"handcuffing" of the federal judiciary accomplished by the Sentencing Reform Act and
the Feeney Amendment.
These decisions during the 2000-2004 Terms were particularly surprising in light
of the Court's earlier rulings on the Federal Guidelines. In every case directly
challenging their constitutionality (though none specifically concerned the Sixth
Amendment's right to a jury trial), the Court upheld the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
from attack. In Mistretta v. United States,70 the Court upheld the Sentencing Reform
Act against a claim that it violated separation of powers via the nondelegation doctrine.
In United States v. Dunnigan,7 1 the Court upheld the guideline perjury enhancement
against a challenge that it violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to testify in her
own behalf. In Witte v. United States72 and United States v. Watts,73 the Court upheld
the Guidelines against claims that double jeopardy prohibited judicial findings that
increase a sentence based upon uncharged and acquitted conduct, and in Edwards v.
United States,74 the Court upheld the practice of judicial findings regarding the type and
quantity of drugs required to enhance a sentence against a Due Process challenge.
The Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey75 would be the first in a
series of decisions that would rock the sentencing world. The case did not involve a
guidelines system or mandatory sentencing, though that issue was front and center at oral
argument and in the majority and dissenting opinions. The case concerned the
constitutionality of one of the laws that had become known as "sentence enhancements."
Under these types of provisions, the judge determined at sentencing, using a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, whether the defendant had committed
the crime in the manner that triggered the enhancement. In Apprendi, the enhancement
concerned whether the defendant committed his weapon offense with "racial animus"
against an African-American victim. Such a finding doubled the maximum penalty for
69. U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
70. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
71. 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
72. 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
73. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
74. 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
75. 530 U.S. 466.
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the crime of conviction (from 10 to 20 years imprisonment), and Mr. Apprendi was
sentenced to 12 years.
The Court held that the sentence enhancement in Apprendi violated the defendant's
constitutional rights in that it increased the penalty for the crime of conviction beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum for that offense without giving the defendant the right
to have the decision made by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.76 The
effects of Apprendi were immediate and far-reaching. In one fell swoop, Apprendi had
the effect of invalidating numerous sentencing enhancements and other similar
sentencing provisions, causing a flood of petitions to be filed by inmates seeking to
overturn their sentences. 77  Though speculation was rampant as to whether Justice
O'Connor was correct in her prediction that this opinion would also sound the "death
knell" for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 most experts concluded that the Court
was unlikely to invalidate guidelines systems like that in the federal system and similar
ones in about a dozen states.
79
Justice Steven Breyer, who served as one of the original members of the United
States Sentencing Commission that devised the Guidelines, dissented. He shared Justice
O'Connor's fear that the Apprendi decision would create "serious concerns about the
constitutionality" of guidelines systems and could threaten the continued existence of
systems designed to promote uniformity. His preference for preserving as much of the
guidelines system as possible would become even more apparent in future cases.
The distinction between the Apprendi case and federal guidelines sentencing is that
in Apprendi the statutory maximum punishment was increased by the enhancement,
whereas an increase above a calculated Federal Sentencing Guidelines range does not
explicitly affect the statutory maximum for the offense. The Federal Guidelines range
requires a judge to sentence all similar bank robbers to a sentence within a narrow range,
say 10-12 years, even though the maximum punishment allowed by the statute
criminalizing bank robbery provides for a much higher possible ceiling, say 20 years.
Going above the presumptive guidelines range to take into account certain aggravating
facts does not technically increase the statutory maximum provided in the substantive
criminal statute. Thus, despite the fears expressed by Justices O'Connor and Breyer that
the Apprendi rule would invalidate guidelines systems, most experts believed the Court
would draw a distinction between the maximum statutory punishment, and the maximum
limit of a guideline range. As it turns out, the dissenting justices were right, and the
experts were wrong.
The battle over the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Reform Act began
in earnest in Blakely v. Washington, a case in which the Court sent shock waves
76. Id. at 496-97.
77. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apr~s Apprendi, 12 Fed. Senten. Rep. 331 (2000) [hereinafter King &
Klein, Apris Apprendi]; Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, apps. B-C
(2001) [hereinafter King & Klein, Essential Elements] (providing appendices of state and federal statutes containing
enhancements that must go to the jury after Apprendi, such as drug quantity, serious bodily injury, and amount of
fraud/theft loss).
78. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. See King & Klein, Essential Elements, supra n. 77, at 1485.
80. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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through the federal criminal justice system (and through those state criminal justice
systems with similar mandatory sentencing guidelines). The issue in Blakely was
whether the state trial judge's act of imposing a 90-month sentence-37 months above
the 53-month sentence dictated by the Washington's Sentencing Reform Act-violated
Blakely's constitutional right to a jury trial on facts leading to the increase in the
sentence.
The petitioner, Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., kidnapped his estranged wife, Yolanda,
binding her with duct tape and forcing her at knifepoint into a wooden box in the bed of
his pickup truck. All the while, he begged her to dismiss the divorce suit and related
trust proceedings. When the couple's 13-year-old son, Ralphy, returned home from
school, Blakely ordered him to follow in another car, threatening Yolanda with a shotgun
if he did not obey. Ralphy managed escape and sought help when they stopped at a gas
station, but Blakely continued on with Yolanda to a friend's house in Montana. He was
arrested after the friend called the police.
Blakely pled guilty to the charges of second-degree kidnapping involving domestic
violence and use of a firearm. The guidelines established in the Washington Sentencing
Reform Act made him eligible for a presumptive sentence of anywhere from 49 to 53
months for the crimes of conviction, and the State prosecutor had recommended a
sentence within the range. After hearing Yolanda's description of the kidnapping, the
judge disregarded the prosecutor's recommendation and imposed an "exceptional
sentence" of 90 months on the ground that Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty."
Like the Federal Guidelines, upon a finding of certain aggravating facts, the sentencing
guidelines statute allowed the judge to increase the sentence above the presumptive
sentencing range. The operative question was whether the Supreme Court would find
that Blakely was entitled to have a jury decide those aggravating facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Justice Department had kept a keen eye on Blakely, even though it was not a
federal case. The constitutional principles announced there would likely apply equally to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as to all those state criminal systems around the
country with mandatory sentencing guidelines. DOJ filed an amicus brief echoing the
same arguments already made by the State of Washington. 8 1 Both briefs argued that the
holding of Apprendi did not apply, and that if such a rule were applied to a guideline
sentencing decision it would render unworkable valuable sentencing reform efforts.
Both Washington State and the DOJ were clearly convinced that the Court could
potentially abolish guidelines sentencing altogether by declaring much of the framework
unconstitutional.
The Blakely case provided the Supreme Court the opportunity to limit the Apprendi
ruling to cases in which judges increased sentence beyond the statutory maximum stated
in the substantive criminal statute. In this case, the kidnapping statute of which Blakely
was convicted allowed for a statutory maximum of 10 years. The judge imposed a
sentence of 90 months, or 71/2 years, well within the statutory maximum. But on June 24,
2004, Justice Scalia, writing for the same five justice majority that comprised the
81. Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respt., Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.
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Apprendi majority, dropped a bomb on the state and federal sentencing landscape by
choosing not to define "statutory maximum" in this way. "[T]he relevant 'statutory
maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional
facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings." 82  The
additional facts here showing "deliberate cruelty" were presented through Yolanda's
testimony at the sentencing hearing-and not by a jury trial or through the defendant's
admissions in pleading guilty. Thus, the Court declared that Blakely was deprived of his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof
on these important facts.
Perhaps as alarming as the actual Sixth Amendment holding was the absence of
any discussion regarding the remedy. Blakely simply struck down the guidelines system
but did not indicate whether any modifications to the system could save those guidelines
from total demise. Lawyers and judges in Washington State and the dozen or so other
states with similar laws-not to mention the federal system-were left to scramble to
figure out how to respond. The Court did not give even a hint as to whether the Federal
Guidelines would meet the same fate as the ones in Washington State.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, along with three of her brethren, protested the
decision, calling it a "number 10 earthquake." 83 It is hard to overstate the level of chaos
that broke out in the federal criminal system in the wake of Blakely. Judges were called
upon to decide whether the constitutional rule announced in Blakely even applied to the
Federal Guidelines, and if so, what that meant for how individuals should be tried and
sentenced. Defense attorneys struggled to figure out how best to protect the interests of
their clients whose cases were pending, and they scrambled to file briefs seeking to
overturn the sentences of clients whose cases had already resulted in sentences imposed
by judges. Federal prosecutors scratched their heads trying to figure out whether they
should include aggravating circumstances set out in the Guidelines in their indictments,
and what sort of procedure they should propose for sentencing.
By July 2, 2004, only a week after Blakely had been decided, DOJ had issued a
memorandum to their prosecutors first announcing the Department's position that the
holding does not apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines but then offering a
complicated set of instructions in the event that it does. Prosecutors were instructed to
charge aggravating factors from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in their indictments,
to obtain superseding indictments for all cases that had not yet resulted in a guilty plea or
a trial, to file briefs with the district judge suggesting that the court need not submit these
new aggravating facts to the jury but rather continue to find facts at sentencing hearings,
to "immediately seek to obtain plea agreements that contain waivers of all rights under
Blakely," to direct probation officers to continue to prepare presentence reports that
calculate Guidelines sentences, to request that district judges state alternative Blakely and
non-Blakely sentences on the record, and, finally, to collect data on all sentences altered
as a result of Blakely. Courts were wildly split on what approach they should take in
82. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04.
83. See Thompson, supra n. 2, at 269 (citing Charles Lane, Supreme Court to Consider Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, Wash. Post AI0 (Oct. 3, 2004) (quoting Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's comment on the Blakely case
made at the Ninth Circuit's annual conference in July 2004).
2009]
21
Klein and Thompson: DOJ's Attack on Federal Judicial Leniency, the Supreme Court's Re
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2008
TULSA LA W REVIEW
sentencing. The utter confusion brought the entire federal criminal system to a
screeching halt when most defense attorneys decided the best course was to request
delays in their cases until the whole mess was resolved.
As the volume of pending cases quickly mounted, the federal courts frantically
sought answers. So desperate was the need for resolution that on July 14, 2004, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a unanimous plea to the Supreme Court strongly
urging the Supreme Court to decide immediately whether the Federal Guidelines were
unconstitutional. 84 All thirteen of the active judges within the Circuit added their names
to this odd public demand for answers. "We are convinced that a prompt and
authoritative answer to our inquiry is needed to avoid a major disruption in the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts-a disruption that would be unfair
to defendants, to crime victims, to the public, and to the judges who must follow
applicable constitutional requirements." 85  For the Circuit to take the highly unusual
approach of "certifying" questions for the Supreme Court and making an impassioned
plea for a quick decision shows just how dysfunctional the federal courts had become
following Blakely's blockbuster ruling. It was the judicial equivalent of having a group
of judges jump up and down yelling "Help!" at the Supreme Court! The Supreme Court,
for the moment, ignored the jumping judges.
The State of Washington asked the Supreme Court to reconsider Blakely. It argued
that Blakely had "produced greater disruption, and more adverse consequences for
defendants, than the majority had anticipated." In addition to the disruption in the
federal system, Washington State noted that these issues were also of great importance to
"over a third of the States" that had adopted guideline systems.86 The Supreme Court
ignored the request.
For the next six months, the Supreme Court allowed federal district courts to linger
in their paralysis and the Circuits to maintain their splits. Proposing "fixes" for the
system, speculation about what the Supreme would do, and the close reading of tea
leaves became common pastimes. Most observers agreed that there were no principled
reasons to distinguish the Washington State and federal systems. 87 They were much
more alike than they were different. Many also wondered whether the judiciary's ire
toward Congress over the Feeney Amendment might motivate the Supreme Court to
declare the Federal Guidelines unconstitutional without suggesting a "fix," like they did
the Washington State guidelines. By striking the system down without offering possible
solutions to remedy the problems, the Court would further wreak havoc nationwide,
leaving it to Congress to clean up the mess. Such a move might have ended the 20-year
social experiment that the adoption of mandatory federal guidelines represented and
84. Chief Judge John M. Walker wrote the opinion "certifying" three questions on the application of Blakely to
the federal guidelines that the judges wanted the Supreme Court to decide. U.S. v. Penaranda, 375 F.3d 238, 239-
40, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2004) (certifying questions and seeking expedited review pertaining to the constitutionality of
the Guidelines in order to minimize the impending crisis in federal courts' administration in light of thousands of
cases to be decided in coming months).
85. id. at 246.
86. Pet. for Rehearing on Behalf of the St. of Wash. at 10, Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.
87. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 Fed. Senten. Rep. 316, 317 (2004) (arguing that the
DOJ's distinction between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington state system was untenable, and
predicting that the Court would be unlikely to accept it).
[Vol. 44:519
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 44 [2008], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol44/iss3/4
FUTURE OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING
caused us to revert back to completely discretionary sentencing.
Instead, in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court essentially split the baby.
In the first part of the decision, one group of five justices concluded that the Guidelines
were unconstitutional for the same reasons that it gave in the Blakely case. However,
unlike the Blakely case, this time the Court also included a critical second half. In this
section of the decision, a different group of five justices (with the exception of Justice
Ginsburg who was in the majority in the first part as well) found a way to save the
Guidelines from demise.
DOJ initially filed a brief in the Booker case arguing that the differences between
the Washington State guidelines and the Federal Guidelines justified applying a different
rule. 88 However, the Department's lawyers recognized that this argument was not likely
to win the day, and oral argument in the case was half-hearted.89 Interestingly, DOJ
seemed to think it was likely that the Court would graft jury trial rights on the existing
system, requiring that juries decide all the facts contained in the federal sentencing
manual that triggered a higher sentence. This is how the state of Kansas and the federal
government had responded to the elements rule after Apprendi. Judges in Kansas asked
juries to decide whether defendants had committed a particular crime out of racial
animus, for example. 90  Juries in federal trials were asked to make factual findings
regarding type and quantity of drugs when such facts triggered an enhanced penalty
under the drug trafficking statutes.
9 1
However, DOJ further argued (quite rightly) that to incorporate jury trial rights
into the Federal Guidelines system would be inconsistent with the legislative design of
the Guidelines, so the Court should avoid such an outcome. Congress very clearly
relegated sentencing fact-finding decisions to the court alone. The Commission filed a
brief as amicus curiae that did little more than to agree with the government and
encourage the Court to preserve the role of the Commission by preserving the
Guidelines.
Booker's defense attorneys argued that there was no principled distinction between
the Washington State guidelines and the Federal Guidelines. One might have thought
that they would argue that the Court should strike down the Guidelines as a whole, which
might then lead to the return to totally discretionary sentencing as it existed prior to the
adoption of the Guidelines in 1987. One can imagine that the defense might have
preferred such an outcome to one that maintained the structured Guidelines mostly intact.
Yet, the defense in fact argued that the Court could "sever" the parts of the statute that
authorized the Guidelines but improperly failed to include a jury trial right. The defense
attorneys favored a decision requiring that sentencing issues be added to jury trials but
that otherwise kept the Guidelines intact.
Some members of Congress had their say as well. Submitting their own amicus
briefs, the original sponsors of the legislation that led to the adoption of the Guidelines,
88. Reply Br. for the U.S., Booker, 543 U.S. 220.
89. Michael Dreeben, a talented attorney now Deputy Solicitor General, appeared uncomfortable.
90. See State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001) (state judicial response to Apprendi was to send aggravating
facts to the jury; this was then confirmed by the legislature in 2004).
91. See King & Klein, Apr6s Apprendi, supra n. 77.
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Senators Hatch and Kennedy, along with other Senators, asked the Court to keep in mind
all the bipartisan work and compromise that went into creating the Guidelines. Clearly,
there was great anxiety among the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee that their
handiwork would be abolished.
The group that may have exerted the most influence, perhaps not surprisingly,
seems to have been "an ad hoc group of former federal judges in support of neither
party." The lead author of the brief submitted on behalf of a total of 19 judges was none
other than John Martin, Jr., the same judge who resigned in protest over the Feeney
Amendment. The judges wanted a return to the good old days before the dreaded Feeney
Amendment. They liked the idea of the Guidelines as true "guidelines," rather than as
mandatory rules such as they were originally designed. They also longed for the days
when they could go above or below the Guidelines sentencing range without much fear
of reversal by the appellate courts. In other words, they sought a return to the standard of
appellate review that the Court had adopted in the Koon case, and which the Feeney
Amendment had replaced with a standard that showed the sentencing judge virtually no
deference. Along the same lines, the public interest group called "Families against
Mandatory Minimums" also weighed in with an amicus brief favoring "non-binding"
guidelines.
DOJ recognized that the winds might be turning in the direction of advisory
guidelines, although there was still a profound fear that the entire sentencing guidelines
structure would be jettisoned. In its reply brief, submitted in response to the plethora of
views expressed in the other briefs submitted, DOJ asked the Court not to incorporate
juries into any part of the guidelines system and not to do away with the system as a
whole.92 Instead, the DOJ preferred to make the Guidelines advisory, but for only a
limited class of cases-those in which an enhancement would raise the sentence beyond
the otherwise presumptive guidelines range. DOJ saw no need for making all guidelines
sentencing advisory. Since there is only a jury trial right in those cases in which a judge
chooses to go above the Guidelines range, the remedy of making the Guidelines purely
advisory need only apply to those cases.
On January 12, 2005, the DOJ lost a major battle in its campaign to reign in the
"lenient" federal judiciary. The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker
brought to a halt the drive to shift the power to punish away from the judiciary and put it
in the hands of federal prosecutors at Main Justice. One scholar described the opinion as
a "two-headed monster and a conceptual monstrosity."9 3 It is as if the Court decided to
play softball and divided itself into two teams of four, reserving Justice Ginsburg as a
utility player for both teams. Each team then got to decide one-half of the case. Team
A, led by Justice Stevens, authored the first "merits" part of the "opinion of the Court"
concluding that the Guidelines were unconstitutional as written. Juries, not judges,
should decide aggravating factors. Team B, with Justice Breyer serving as captain,
authored the second "remedial" part in which the other "majority" saved the Guidelines
from demise by severing the problematic parts and by making the whole system
92. See Br. for the U.S., supra n. 81.
93. Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 387, 387 (2006).
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"advisory." Judges, not juries, decide aggravating facts. The members of each team
then also filed dissenting opinions to the other team's part of the "opinion of the
Court."
9 4
The Booker remedial opinion was a coalition formed to strike down the Feeney
Amendment to the PROTECT Act rather than to provide a coherent Sixth Amendment
theory. Since Justice Breyer was one of the original members of the Commission during
the time when the Commission was first charged with drafting the Guidelines, it makes
sense that he would be keenly concerned with preserving them. His dissenting opinion
in the Blakely case from the previous Term certainly gave every indication he would not
agree to discard the Guidelines. In fact, Booker was Justice Breyer's fifth attempt to
make the Guidelines advisory (other attempts included his proposal for advisory
guidelines in the initial draft of the Guidelines that he wrote as chief counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Committee in the late 1970s, his recommendation when, as a First
Circuit judge, he sat on the Sentencing Commission, and his signing on to the Koon
decision in 1996). 95
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined the remedial opinion. Justice O'Connor
had teamed up with Justice Breyer in Blakely for many of the same reasons. Her position
was probably informed by her prior experience as a state legislator and her concern that
legislatures, both state and federal, should be shown deference by the Supreme Court.
Justice Kennedy was certainly influenced by his intense disapproval of the shift from
judicial to prosecutorial discretion at sentencing. He had taken the unusual approach of
delivering a public address in which he was very candid about his disapproval of
mandatory minimum sentences.96  Much of the criticism he makes about mandatory
minimums applies with equal force to the issue of whether the Guidelines should be
maintained in their mandatory form, especially in the post-Feeney Amendment world in
which judges no longer had much discretion in sentencing.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also joined the team that transformed the Guidelines into
an advisory system. He approached the issues in Booker from a different perspective
than those of the other justices. As Chief Justice, he was outspoken in support of federal
judges. He frequently gave public addresses on issues such as providing adequate
security for federal judges and increasing their salaries, and he also often gave lectures
94. Booker, 543 U.S. 220. The majority merits opinion was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Thomas, Scalia, and Souter. The majority remedial opinion was written by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
95. Klein, supra n. 2, at 695, 717-19 (providing details of the five times Justice Breyer attempted to ensure that
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were advisory).
96.
Under the federal mandatory minimum statutes a sentence can be mitigated by a prosecutorial decision
not to charge certain counts. There is debate about this, but in my view a transfer of sentencing discretion
from a judge to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, often not much older than the defendant, is misguided. Often
these attorneys try in good faith to be fair in the exercise of discretion. The policy, nonetheless, gives the
decision to an assistant prosecutor not trained in the exercise of discretion and takes discretion from the
trial judge. The trial judge is the one actor in the system most experienced with exercising discretion in a
transparent, open, and reasoned way. Most of the sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not
the prosecutors.
Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech, The American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), in 16 Fed.
Senten. Rep. 126, 127 (2003) (emphasis added).
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on the role that former justices had played in America's history. On May 5, 2003, Chief
Justice Rehnquist gave a speech at the Board of Directors Meeting of the Federal Judges
Association, where he addressed the Feeney Amendment. Interestingly, he believed that
it was part of Congress's legitimate function to reduce the frequency of downward
departures. He also had no problem with Congress's desire to collect sentencing
information. What troubled the Chief Justice about the new law was the collection of
sentencing information on an individualized judge-by-judge basis, what some had called
the "black-listing" of federal judges who departed downward. These developments
threatened judicial independence by putting judges in fear of possible removal, or at least
embarrassment, if Congress disapproved of their sentencing decisions. He saw this
aspect of the Feeney Amendment as posing a threat of "an unwarranted and ill-
considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial
duties." 97 Given his steadfast protectiveness of the role of federal judges for whom he
felt responsible as Chief Justice, it is not surprising that he would vote with the team that
transformed the Guidelines into an advisory system. In so doing, he ensured that federal
judges would regain their power to punish offenders as they see fit without fear of being
targeted by Congress for their decisions.
Main Justice was rattled. It first attempted to recreate the pre-Booker system
through charging and pleading rules. In a memorandum distributed the same day that
Booker was rendered, the DOJ instructed prosecutors to argue in all cases that the district
judge should impose a sentence consistent with the Guidelines, as it "reflects the distilled
wisdom of the Sentencing Commission" and thus yields a reasonable sentence.
98
Another Main Justice DOJ memorandum from Main Justice to all federal prosecutors
attempted to reign in perceived leniency by Assistants in some districts. The
memorandum reminded federal prosecutors to continue to charge and demand a plea to
the most serious readily provable offenses, as defined by the Ashcroft Memorandum. It
demanded that federal prosecutors "actively seek sentences within the range established
by the Sentencing Guidelines," obtain supervisory authorization before stipulating to a
sentence outside the Guidelines or refraining from objecting to such a sentence, and
make a record in the district court of the government's opposition to all sentences below
the Guidelines range.
99
When that did not produce satisfactory results, and compliance with the Guidelines
overall appeared to be decreasing and stories of widely variant sentences, especially
between districts, started growing, the Department turned to a statutory remedy. Less
than a month after the Booker decision, Alberto Gonzales assumed the role of Attorney
General. He soon got up-to-speed on the whole sentencing controversy and gave a
97. William H. Rehnquist, Speech, Remarks of the Chief Justice (Fed. JJ. Assn. Bd. of Dirs. Meeting, May 5,
2003), at http:llwww.supremecoutus.gov/publicinfo/speechestsp__95-05-03.html (last updated Feb. 8, 2005).
98. Memo. from Mary Beth Buchanan, Dir., Exec. Off. U.S. Attys., to all United States Attorneys, all First
Assistant and United States Attorneys, all Criminal Chiefs, all Civil Chiefs, all Appellate Chiefs, Initial Guidance in
U.S. v. Booker and U.S. v. Fanfan (Jan. 12, 2005) (copy on file with authors) (quoting Memo. from Patty Merkamp
Stemler, Chief App. Sec., U.S. Dept. of Just., to all Federal Prosecutors, Supreme Court Decision in United States v.
Booker and United States v. Fanfan 2 (Jan. 12, 2005) (copy on file with authors).
99. Memo. from Dep. Atty. Gen. James B. Comey to all Federal Prosecutors (Jan. 28, 2005), in 17 Fed. Semen.
Rep. 282, 283 (2005).
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speech in June of 2005 with the DOJ's new proposal for a Booker "fix." 10 0 Attorney
General Gonzales espoused a proposal that was the brainchild of a law professor and
former DOJ lawyer, Frank 0. Bowman III. Bowman had pointed out that "topless
guidelines" would not violate the jury trial right that the Supreme Court had declared in
Apprendi, Blakely and Booker.l0 1 The Supreme Court said that a defendant had a right
to a jury trial on facts that increased the sentence, but it did not say that the same applied
to facts that decreased the sentence, or imposed a mandatory minimum sentence. Thus,
Bowman noticed that a system that was mandatory as to the minimum sentences and
then advisory as to the maximums would pass the constitutional test. DOJ officials had
an "aha!" moment, and the Attorney General and his top deputies began promoting the
idea of a topless guidelines system.
Such a fix would not be airtight, as the Court's position on whether the Apprendi
rule applied to mandatory minimums was quite a close one. In a 1986 case, the Court, in
a sharply divided decision, held that a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for the
visible possession of a firearm during an aggravated assault could be imposed based
solely on the trial judge's factual finding regarding the weapon at a sentencing hearing-
the jury need only find the aggravated assault. 1° 2 However, in Harris v. United
States,10 3 a case decided shortly after Apprendi but before Blakely and Booker, that same
reasoning persuaded only four Justices. They held in a plurality opinion that historical
practice supported a rule that a fact that increased the mandatory minimum (here the
penalty was increased from five to seven years based upon fact that defendant
"brandished" rather than "carried" a firearm during his drug trafficking offense), but not
the statutory maximum (here life imprisonment), need not be found by a jury using the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
The four Harris dissenters, on the other hand, reasoned that mandatory minimum
statutes limit the jury's role in exactly the same fashion as did the increased statutory
maximum in Apprendi, by imposing mandatory higher penalties based upon facts not
even submitted for their consideration. It was Justice Breyer, the architect of the
Guidelines, who granted the winning fifth vote to the plurality opinion. Though it is
clear from his concurring opinion that he agreed with the reasoning of the Harris dissent,
he nevertheless voted against extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums because he
was worried about the "adverse... consequences" 10 4 this would have on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
A deliberate Congressional circumvention of the jury's role through a device like
topless guidelines just might be enough to result in a future 5-4 opinion in the other
direction. However, before the Department's new agenda could gain any momentum in
100. Alberto Gonzalez, Speech, Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Natl. Ctr. for Victims of Crime, June 21, 2005),
in 17 Fed. Senten. Rep. 324 (2005).
101. Memo. from Frank Bowman to the U.S. Senten. Commn. (June 27, 2004), in 16 Fed. Senten. Rep. 364, 367-
68 (2004) (noting that Congress could amend the guidelines by raising the ceiling in each of its 258 boxes of the grid
to life imprisonment, thus the new statutory maximum would be the maximum penalty provided in the substantive
criminal statute, not the much lower maximum provided by each box of the Federal Sentencing Guideline grid).
102. McMillan v. Pa., 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (5-4 decision).
103. 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (4-14 decision).
104. Id. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Congress, the 2006 elections swept out a large number of Republicans and installed
Democrats who had little interest in promoting mandatory minimums or curbing federal
judicial discretion. 10 5 Indeed, the sentencing momentum seemed to shift in the opposite
direction, and the federal courts settled into the advisory guidelines system ushered in by
Booker. The next highly contested issue was whether the Department could move the
Guidelines back toward a semi-mandatory regime by stricter appellate review of the
"reasonableness" of particular sentences.
Most of the press accounts of Booker focused on the remedial majority's holding
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were now advisory. But it was the second part of
that opinion, excising the Sentencing Reform Act's provision requiring appellate review
for conformity with the Guidelines in favor of a review of federal criminal sentences for
"reasonableness," that generated an immediate circuit split among the federal Courts of
Appeals. The Department attempted to recreate mandatory guidelines, to the extent
possible, by obtaining appellate reversals of sentences below the guideline range. 106 The
Department was remarkably successful in the year following Booker-it convinced
seven of the 11 circuits that had addressed the issue to presume that within-Guidelines
sentences were reasonable, 10 7 persuaded nine of the 11 circuits that had addressed the
issue to require district judges to provide "extraordinary" justifications for outside-
Guidelines sentences, 108 and convinced seven of the nine circuits that had addressed the
issue to automatically reverse deviations based on district judges' policy disagreements
with the Guidelines. 10 9  Fifteen of the 21 below-guideline sentences imposed shortly
after Booker were reversed as unreasonable and remanded for resentencing while only
two of the 16 above-guideline cases were successfully reversed. Moreover, of the scores
of within-guideline sentences imposed during that time-period, only one sentence was
reversed as unreasonable. 
1 10
However, the Department's win with the appellate courts was not replicated before
the Supreme Court. In Rita v. United States,111 the first post-Booker case from the
October 2006 Term, the Court affirmed an appellate presumption that within-Guideline
sentences are reasonable, though it noted that appellate courts need not apply such a
presumption, and trial courts may not apply it. More importantly, the Court noted that
neither trial nor appellate courts may presume that outside-Guideline sentences are
unreasonable. The trial judge had sentenced Mr. Rita, a former military man, to 33
105. Congress rejected a bill implementing Attorney General Gonzales' proposed transformation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines into a complex series of mandatory minimum penalties. Defending America's Most
Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. § 12 (Apr. 6,
2005) (adding new or increased mandatory minimum sentences, eliminating most possible grounds for departures or
non-guideline sentences under the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and imposing heightened procedural
requirements only where the court is considering a sentence below the applicable guideline range).
106. Another method of recreating the Guidelines is through negotiated pleas, which now account for 97 percent
of federal felony cases. See supra n. 34. While DOJ attempted this following Blakely, see the text on pages 121-22,
Main Justice was ultimately unsuccessful in imposing its will on the filed offices and the defense bar.
107. See Rita v. U.S., 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
108. See Br. for U.S. at 13 n. 3, Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586 (collecting cases).
109. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558, 566 n. 4 (collecting cases).
110. U.S. Senten. Commn., Report on Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing 30 ex. 2 (Mar.
2006) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/Booker._Report.pdf).
111. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
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months in prison (the lowest term in the 33-41 guideline range) for lying to the grand
jury about his purchase of a kit to assemble a machine-gun. 112 Though it is acceptable
for the appellate court to defer to this sentence as presumptively reasonable, the appellate
court should be deferential, in the future, where such a judge sentences outside (below or
above) the Guidelines range. Below-Guideline sentences cannot be presumed
unreasonable on appeal or the Guidelines transform back to mandatory ones that violate
the Sixth Amendment.
The Department lost the next two Court battles, and the Court continued to protect
federal district court discretion by overturning both appellate reversals and reinstating
each district judge's original below-guideline sentence. A substantial majority of the
Court held in Gall v. United States that appellate courts may not require extraordinary
justifications from trial judges for sentences that vary from the Guidelines but must
review each sentence (whether within or outside the Guidelines), individually and
deferentially for abuse of discretion. 113 The more searching de novo review mandated
by Congress in the Feeney Amendment is unconstitutional because it gives the
Guidelines too much binding authority. Thus, the Court reinstated the trial court's
original sentence of probation rather than the guideline's recommended range of 30-37
months, based upon the trial judge's determination that the defendant's youth,
willingness to withdraw from and confess to the drug conspiracy, and post-offense
rehabilitation warranted leniency. The message from the Supreme Court to the Courts of
Appeal and the Department is clear-that the appellate court might reasonably reach a
higher within-guideline sentence does not justify a reversal, and the fact that the sentence
is significantly below the Guideline range does not mean that the Department will prevail
on appeal.
What if the trial judge imposes a low sentence simply because she believes that the
penalties contained in the Guidelines are too harsh? In Kimbrough v. United States, the
trial judge sentenced the defendant to 180 months (the statutory mandatory minimum for
the crack and weapons offenses), rather than the suggested guideline range of 228 to 270
months, because of the "'disproportionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines
have in sentencing,"' 11 4 particularly in regards to African-American defendants.
Pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,115 a drug trafficker dealing in crack
cocaine (a form that is smoked) is subject to the same sentence as one dealing in 100
times more powder cocaine (which is snorted). Though crack and powder cocaine have
the same physiological and psychotropic effects, the statutes and Guideline's
employment of the 100-to-1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses, committed
overwhelmingly by black defendants, three to six times longer than those for offenses
involving equal amounts of powder cocaine (an offense committed overwhelmingly by
white defendants). Had Mr. Kimbrough possessed powder rather than crack cocaine, his
guideline range would have been only 97 to 106 months. The Fourth Circuit vacated his
sentence, holding that any sentence outside the Guidelines range is per se unreasonable
112. Id. at 341-45.
113. 128 S. Ct. at 594-97 (7-2 decision).
114. Id. at 565 (quoting Jt. App. at 72, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558).
115. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
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when based upon a disagreement with the policies inherent in the Guidelines. 116
Again, by a wide margin, the Court disagreed with the government and the
appellate court and reinstated the original sentence. The Court noted that the
Commission had, in a series of reports from 1994-2002, tried to lower the ratio (to 1:1,
5:1, and 20:1) and that Congress had expressly rejected each recommendation or refused
to act.117 The Department opposed each attempt by the Commission to ameliorate a
ratio that both "overstated the relative harmfulness of crack cocaine and generated
unwarranted disparity in sentencing based upon race." 1 18 The Court, despite this history,
reaffirmed that all Guidelines are advisory, and that it is not an abuse of discretion for a
trial judge to find that the Guideline sentence for crack cocaine was too high. The Court
rejected the Solicitor General's argument that the 100-to-i ratio is an exception to the
general freedom that sentencing courts have to "vary [from Guidelines ranges] based
solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines."1
19
The Department continued, at least up until the appointment of Attorney General
Michael B. Mulkasey, to fight federal judicial discretion at sentencing even after Gall
and Kimbrough. The Department argued in briefs filed in a case from the October 2008
Term that the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits were correct in holding that district judges
could not simply replace the Commission's 100:1 ratio in powder versus crack cocaine
sentencing with their own lower ratios but rather could depart below the Guidelines only
based upon "an individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a
particular case." On January 21, 2009, the Court in Spears v. United States12° reinstated
the trial judge's decision to replace the 100-to-1 ratio in all cases with a 20-to-i ratio,
even though the particular defendant presented no special mitigating circumstances. The
whole point of Kimbrough, the Court scolded the Department in its per curiam opinion,
was to recognize district courts' authority "to reject and vary categorically from the
crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines."'
12 1
III. WHAT ABOUT THE STATES?
While the Supreme Court's ire with the DOJ and Congress over federal judicial
116. U.S. v. Kimbrough, 174 Fed. Appx. 798 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted and rev'd, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558
(Oct. 2007 Term).
117. The history of these amendments can be found in Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 569. In May of 2007, the
Commission amended the guidelines by reducing the base offense level for crack cocaine by two levels. See
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28558, 28571-72 (May 21, 2007) (base offense level
reduction leads to ratio between 25:1 and 80:1). Congress allowed this change to take effect on Nov. 1, 2007. In
November and December of 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in
opposition to making that change retroactive.
118. The DOJ's written and oral opposition to each proposal to equalize the ratio can be found in the U.S. Senten.
Commn., Public Hearing on Retroactivity (Nov. 13, 2007) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/Il 1 307/
Transcriptl I 1307.pdo; U.S. Senten. Commn., Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy
apps. B, B-2-B-4 (2007); U.S. Senten. Commn., 2002 Public Hearings (Mar. 19, 2002) (available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ hearings/031902.htm); U.S. Senten. Commn., Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy apps. E, E-2 (2002); U.S. Senten. Commn., Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy (Apr. 1997); 60 Fed. Reg. 25075-77 (May 10, 1995); U.S. Senten. Commn., Special Report to the
Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy app. B (Feb. 1995).
119. Br. for U.S. at 16, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558.
120. 129 S. Ct. 840. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito dissented from the summary reversal.
121. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
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discretion at sentencing was not directed at the states, obviously the Court realized the
import of its holding on state criminal justice systems. After all, Blakely, the case that
set the stage for the Court's application of Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
in Booker, was a state sentencing case. Though there are certainly fascinating and
important state stories to tell, the Supreme Court didn't appear nearly as interested in the
impact of its two revolutionary sentencing rulings on the states. While we do not here
attempt to tell these state stories,122 we believe that the Court's lack of express concern
in its written opinions in Blakely and Booker regarding the effect of these holdings on
state sentencing systems can be sensibly explained in a number of ways.
First, we note that the majority of states (from a low of 29 up to a high of 31,
depending upon how one counts, plus the District of Columbia) were unaffected by the
Sixth Amendment decisions in Blakely and Booker at the time they were rendered
because of the construction of their sentencing regimes. 123 Seventeen states had no
guidelines but rather relied upon essentially unfettered judicial discretion, 124 as the
federal system had prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. This method of
sentencing was overtly blessed by the Court. Seven states and the District of Columbia
already had voluntary rather than mandatory sentencing guidelines, which were likewise
unaffected by the Court's rulings.12 5 Two states had predicted the outcome of Blakely
after Apprendi and had already started sending sentencing aggravators to the jury. 12
6
Finally, five states have jury, rather than judicial, sentencing, 127 and these jurisdictions
were thus unaffected by the new constitutional jury rights requirement.
That left 20 or so states with sentencing systems-either presumptive sentencing
or mandatory guidelines-that utilized arguably mandatory judicial factfinding and were
therefore plausibly at risk by the Blakely/Booker pair. 12 8 Why, then, was the Court
unmoved by the State of Washington's motion to reconsider Blakely in light of the
state's correction of the Blakely Court's count of "nine States" whose sentencing
structures will be effected to the more accurate figure that "is at least double that
number"? 129  And why did the Court, after denying rehearing, refuse to grant
Washington's request to at least stay the petition and allow it to argue on behalf of itself
and as representative of the 17 other states at oral argument Booker? We believe it is
122. One place to look is the National Center for State Courts report on all 50 states' sentencing systems. Natl.
Ctr. for St. Cts., State Sentencing Guidelines: Profiles and Continuum (July 2008) (available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing--and-corrections/NC SC%/20Sentenci
ngl/o20Guidelines%20profiles%2OJuly / 202008.pd).
123. Bibas & Klein, supra n. 2, at 785, at app. B. Illinois and Kansas should probably be added to this list as both
states reacted to Apprendi (prior to Blakely or Booker) by sending facts, which aggravated the penalty at sentencing,
to the jury. See infra n. 124 and accompanying text. See also Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing:
Blakely v. Washington: Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, Vera Inst. of Just. Policy & Prac. Rev.
3-4 (Aug. 2004) (available at http://www.vera.org/publication__pdf/242_456.pd).
124. Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Bibas &
Klein, supra n. 2, at app. B.
125. Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id.
126. See Kan. v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801; State v. Swift, 781 N.E.2d 292 (111. 2002).
127. Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas. See Bibas & Klein, supra n. 2, at app. B.
128. Id. atapp. A, 797-99.
129. Pet. for Rehearing on Behalf of the St. of Wash. at 3, Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (footnote omitted).
2009]
31
Klein and Thompson: DOJ's Attack on Federal Judicial Leniency, the Supreme Court's Re
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2008
TULSA LAW REVIEW
because this categorization of states into those states with systems similar to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and those states dissimilar fails to paint a complete or accurate
picture. There were and are no states with criminal justice or sentencing systems quite
like the federal one. Even those state with mandatory sentencing guidelines crafted by a
commission were as unlike their federal counterpart as night and day.
State criminal justice systems in general (even those states with mandatory
guidelines) never suffered from the federal problems of legislatively-mandated draconian
sentences 130 and reforms that shifted discretion from judge to prosecutor. 13 1 There are
many reasons for this. There remains a significant number of jury trials in most state
systems (unlike the latest federal statistic of 97 percent of criminal defendants pleading
guilty), so the plausible threat of a trial and an acquittal equalize bargaining power a bit
between prosecutors and the defense bar. There are few jurisdictions with sentences as
harsh as those in the federal system. Most non-federal jurisdiction still have parole
boards, which comprise a check on prosecutorial power and the harshness of sentences at
the back end. 132 Most states allow judges to sentence to probation and other non-
incarceration alternatives, a practice that was forbidden by the federal Sentencing
Commission prior to Booker for most offenses. 133 In states that have presumptive
sentencing or guidelines, the players in the system were initially in favor of the proposals
and, after living with the changes, most attorneys supported the reforms as an
improvement over the earlier law. 134 This was quite a different reaction than most
federal judges and the federal Public Defenders Offices had after the Sentencing Reform
Act and Feeney Amendment were enacted.
130. The Bureau of Justice Statistics for 2004 indicate that the mean sentence length (in months) for felons for all
offenses was 37 months in the states and 61 months in the federal justice system. Broken into categories, the mean
maximum sentence for sexual assault was 93 months in the states and 112 months in the federal system. For
robbery, it was 86 months in the states and 105 months in the federal system. And for drug offenses, it was 31
months in the states versus 84 months in the federal system. Dept. of Just., Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court
Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2004-Statistical Tables: Table 1.10 Comparison of Felony Convictions in State
and Federal Courts, 2004, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04l1tab.htm (last
updated July 25, 2007). We also note that "[b]etween 1982 and 1993, overall federal justice system expenditures
increased at twice the rate of comparable state and local expenditures, increasing 317% as compared to 163%. ...
Over a twelve year period, the number or federal prison inmates rose by 177%, as compared to a lower increase in
state prison inmates, 134%." Am. B. Assn. Crim. Just. Sec., Task Force Federalization Crim. L., The Federalization
of Criminal Law 13-14 (1998) (available at http:// www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/legislation/
overcriminalization/SFILE/fedcrimlaw2.pdf (footnotes omitted).
131. "The steady complaints of inflated prosecutorial power heard in the federal system are nowhere echoed in
the commission-guideline states." Model Penal Code: Sentencing 117 (ALl 2003).
132. 16 states have abolished the release discretion of parole boards. Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come
Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry 66 tbl. 3.1 (Oxford U. Press 2003). There were 708,764 adults on parole in the
states as of December 31, 2006. Dept. of Just., Probation and Parole in the United States, 2006 5 tbl. 3 (Dec. 2007)
(available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus06.pdf). The Sentencing Reform Act terminated federal
parole, so federal offenders serve their full sentence, minus a potential 15 percent good time credit.
133. There were 4,212,532 adults on probation in the states in 2006, compared with 24,491 probationers in the
federal system. Id. at 3 tbl. 1. This data excludes county probations, for which data was not available. "Only a
small proportion of federal offenders are sentenced in Zones A (7.9 percent) and B (6.8 percent) and are eligible for
non-prison sentences. U.S. Senten. Commn., Alternative Sentencing in the Federal Criminal Justice System 3 (Jan.
2009) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/generalV20090206_- Altematives.pdf). Increases in the rates of federal
offenders sentenced to prison from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2007 corresponds "to declines in each of the other
sentence categories, probation (13.1 percent to 7.7 percent), probation with alternatives (7.1 percent to 3.9 percent),
and prison with alternatives (4.4 percent to 3.1 percent)." Id. at 5-6 fig. 1.
134. Model Penal Code: Sentencing 115 (ALl prelim. dft. 2003).
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Equally important is the difference between the federal government and the states
in terms of resource restraints. The federal government has such a tiny percentage of the
total number of prisoners (and criminal justice expenditures comprises such a tiny
percent of the annual federal budget) that the federal government can afford to keep
felons locked up, and to keep them locked up for a long time. 135  In state and local
systems, where 90 percent of the nation's criminal felony cases are charged, state and
local governments spend a large percentage of their annual budgets on incarceration
136
and still cannot build prisons fast enough to keep up with harsh sentences. When jails
overcrowd, prisoners are released. 137  This provides an incentive to keep prison
sentences low (or create alternative sanctions), to discourage ceding too much overall
authority to the prosecutors.
Local prosecutors' offices don't assume a conviction and move on immediately to
pleading and sentencing, as do their federal counterparts. Assistant District Attorneys
cannot respond to resource issues in their investigations or to increases in incarceration
costs by ignoring or cherry picking cases, as federal prosecutors are wont to do, as the
buck stops with them.138  If a rape, murder, burglary, or theft occurs in a particular
venue, the police and the District Attorney's Office must attempt to find the perpetrator
and charge her, even if the case barks as fiercely as the eyewitness in the O.J. Simpson
case. A local prosecutor must react to the incident reports brought to her by local police,
and must pursue these cases or heads will roll. 139  Federal prosecutors, on the other
hand, can simply ignore most cases (by dismissing them, never investigating them, or
handing them off to state prosecutors), except for the minority of the federal criminal
docket that concerns exclusively federal matters like immigration and terrorism.
140
Federal prosecutors and their investigative agencies are more frequently proactive, and
can select whom and what to charge, and have the luxury to pursue only the winning
cases.
135. Spending has stayed relatively constant over time except for terrorism funding, which "increased from
approximately $737 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 to approximately $3.6 billion in FY 2006, an increase of
almost 400 percent." Off. of the Inspector Gen., The Department of Justice's Internal Controls over Terrorism
Reporting, http://usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0720/index.htm (Feb. 2007). In 2008, law enforcement activity
accounted for 1.5 percent of the annual budget. Public Budget Database, White House Office of Management and
Budget, 2008 Federal Budget; Law Enforcement Administration of Justice (FY 2008 budget was $2,931,222 in
millions, and the total subfunctions of federal law enforcement activities, federal litigative and judicial activities,
federal correctional activities, and criminal justice assistance equaled 46,202 in millions).
136. In 2007, the states spent more than $44 billion on incarceration costs. The PEW Ctr. on the Sts., supra n. 20,
at 30 tbl. A-2.
137. Over half the states were under court order to reduce prison crowding in the mid 1980s. Gail A. Caputo,
Intermediate Sanctions in Corrections vi (U. of N. Tex. Press 2004).
138. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2005) (making this point in the context of explaining why
pretextual prosecutions are primarily a federal not a state phenomenon).
139. Id. at 603 (noting that DA "must defend their performance before the voters every few years. The upshot is
that both police departments and DAs' offices are held responsible for increases in serious crime." (footnotes
omitted)).
140. About 17 percent of the federal offenders sentenced between FY 1991 through 2007 were for immigration
offenses. U.S. Senten. Commn., The Changing Face of Federal Criminal Sentencing 7 tbl. 2 (2009) (available at
http://www.ussc.gov/general/20090127_ChangingFaceFedSent.pdf). The other categories, fraud, larceny, drugs,
firearms, pornography, arson, and robbery, involve crimes where state and local jurisdictions generally have
concurrent jurisdiction. See id.; U.S. Senten. Commn., Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics (2008).
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Thus, the Court could pretty safely bet that their sentencing opinions would not
wreak the same havoc on states as on the targeted federal sentencing system. 141 Even in
states with mandatory presumptive sentences or guidelines loosely modeled on the
federal reform, the systems were designed to be less complicated, and offer higher levels
of judicial discretion (in the sentencing ranges and the power to depart), than the federal
system. 142 For example, the Federal Guidelines have 43 offense levels, in contrast to 10
levels in most state systems with guidelines. 143  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Manual grid contains 258 sentences boxes, as opposed to the 60 in Minnesota. 144 State
Sentencing Commissions tend to grant state judges substantial power to depart from the
guidelines when they are so inclined. 
145
It should thus be no surprise that 13 of the 20 or so states affected by Blakely
responded, at least initially, the same way that most had responded to Apprendi-they
sent these aggravating facts to the jury for a beyond a reasonable doubt finding. 146 This
is in fact how Washington State eventually reacted to the Blakely decision.147 This did
not create the chaos Justice Breyer predicted for a similar move with the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, as in most jurisdictions there were perhaps a dozen rather than
several hundred potential aggravators to resolve by such jury fact-finding. Moreover, no
state had the complicating federal pre-Booker requirement that judges must sentence for
"relevant conduct" (conduct not charged or acquitted at trial), and for conduct occurring
during the trial (such as perjury and obstruction enhancements). Those sorts of findings
cannot necessarily be discovered and charged in the indictment, as a "Blakelyized"
system would require.
This is not to say that the states were entirely ignored by the Supreme Court post-
Booker. There were a few tussles with recalcitrant states-California and Michigan
prosecutors claimed that systems that appeared mandatory were actually advisory. The
Court in Cunningham v. California was quick to point out that California's sentencing
system, which presumed that the judge should impose the middle of three sentencing
ranges in the ordinary case absent certain judicial findings of fact, was in fact mandatory
and violated the Sixth Amendment. 148  The California legislature responded by
removing the presumption that a defendant would be sentenced in the middle range and
141. We do not mean to suggest here that the state sentencing and criminal justice systems are perfect-far from
it! They suffer grossly from underfimding, especially on the criminal defense side, racism, and many of the other
problems that plague the federal system. Our much narrower claim here is only that the Supreme Court's sentencing
decisions over the last few terms were directed toward and would have a much greater impact on the feds.
142. See generally Model Penal Code: Sentencing 115-25.
143. Marc Miller, True Grid. Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 587, 588-90 (1992).
144. Id. at 611,615.
145. For a description of the Pennsylvania's Sentencing Commission's response to judicial departures, see John
Kramer and Cynthia Kempinen, The Reassessment and Remaking of Pennsylvania's Sentencing Guidelines, 8 Fed.
Senten. Rep. 74 (1995).
146. Bibas & Klein, supra n. 2, at 786 n. 51. See also Norman Abrams and Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal
Law and Its Enforcement 899 (2006) ("In the wake of Booker, some of the states with simpler guidelines have
adopted jury fact finding with no apparent difficulties.").
147. Shortly after Blakely was rendered but before Booker, the Washington legislature amended its statute,
sending aggravating factors to the jury. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9.94A.535, 9.94A.537 (2008).
148. 549 U.S. at 293-94.
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instead gave the trial judge discretion to choose between the three ranges. 149 The Court
was less assertive in its response to the Michigan Supreme Court's holding in Michigan
v. McCuller150 that its system, similar to California's, likewise was consistent with
Blakely/Booker. The Court vacated that opinion in light of Cunningham.15 1 However,
the Michigan Court responded to the remand with another opinion declaring its system
truly advisory, and hence constitutional.
152
The Blakely and Booker opinions led to what we see as a relatively sharp increase
in states interpreting their present guidelines systems to be voluntary rather than
mandatory, avoiding the jury issue altogether. Since Blakely, three state Supreme
Courts, in New Jersey, Ohio, and Michigan, interpreted the guidelines systems they had
in place prior to Blakely to be voluntary ones not subject to the rule. Three additional
state legislatures, in California, Indiana, and Tennessee, amended their formerly
mandatory guidelines regimes into advisory ones, and thus again not subject to a Sixth
Amendment challenge. 153  This brings the number of jurisdictions with advisory
guidelines up to 14. Even the American Law Institute's new Model Sentencing Project,
which had originally (post-Apprendi but pre-Booker) proposed that the small number of
mandatory aggravators selected by its Sentencing Commission and contained in its
sentencing guidelines be sent to the jury for a beyond a reasonable doubt finding, now
includes a "second-preference alternative to the presumptive guideline system" that
transforms the mandatory scheme into an advisory one, bypassing Sixth Amendment
concerns and the jury's role. 154
Finally, we note that most states have maintained a relatively high level of judicial
discretion even after Blakely by utilizing the common law rule permitting judges to
decide whether to run a defendant's sentences concurrently or consecutively when that
defendant is convicted of multiple offenses (as is often the case). However, 18 states had
systems in place prior to Blakely that permitted stacking of sentences in this manner only
after judicial fact-finding. 15 5  The BlakelylBooker cases generated a state split over
whether this practice violated the Sixth Amendment, and the Court chose judicial
discretion over jury findings. In its latest sentencing opinion from the October 2008
Term, Oregon v. Ice, a five member majority upheld a state statute that permitted a trial
judge to stack sentences only after a finding that the offenses did not arise from the same
course of conduct, indicated the defendant's willingness to commit more than one
criminal act, or caused a risk of greater harm to the victims. 156 The majority ignored the
149. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1170(b) (West Supp. 2009).
150. 715 NW.2d 798 (Mich. 2006) (judicial fact-finding regarding defendant's use of a weapon and injury to a
victim, for the purpose of determining whether to impose an intermediate sanction or a prison term, did not violate
Blakely under Michigan's indeterminate sentencing scheme).
151. McCuller,569 U.S. 1197.
152. Mich. v. McCuller, 739 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Mich. 2007) (reaffirming original decision, after case remanded in
light of Blakely).
153. Bibas & Klein, supra n. 2, at app. A, 797-99.
154. Model Penal Code: Sentencing (ALl prelim. dft. no. 4, 2005), Prof. Kevin R. Reitz, Univ. of Minn.,
Reporter). See also Christopher Slobogin, Symposium on the Model Penal Code's Sentencing Provisions, 61 Fla. L.
Rev. - (forthcoming 2009) (available at SSRN) (providing an excellent history of the MPC Sentencing Project
from 1998 to the present, and a nice description of its current provisions).
155. Bibas & Klein, supra n. 2, at app. C, tbls. I, II, IV.
155. 129 S. Ct. at 719.
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pesky fact that Oregon's sentencing scheme allows judges rather than juries to find the
facts necessary to the punishment imposed. Instead, it held that "historical practice and
respect for state sovereignty-counsel against extending Apprendi's rule."1 5 7 In an
opinion that Justice Scalia correctly notes is "a virtual copy of the dissents" in
Apprendi,158 the majority explained that States could easily avoid the alternative rule by
giving judges unfettered discretion in deciding whether sentences should run
consecutively or concurrently, or by presuming sentences for multiple offenses run
consecutively but allowing sentencing judges to order concurrent sentences upon a
finding of cause (after all, the Sixth Amendment does not mandate that mitigating facts
be sent to the jury).
The decision makes sense, however, in light of the Court's transformation of the
Sixth Amendment from a right to a jury trial in Apprendi into a due process-like right to
sentencing judge discretion subject only to extremely deferential appellate review in
Booker/Kimbrough/Gall. The majority disfavors using that rule to limit the ability of
judges to "find facts about the nature of the offense or the character of the defendant in
determining, for example, the length of supervised release following service of a prison
sentence, required attendance at drug rehabilitation programs or terms of community
service, and the imposition of statutorily prescribed fines and orders of restitution."
Though the Court's interpretation of Apprendi to sentencing matters may not be entirely
logical or principled, it stays the course.
IV. CONCLUSION
Four years after the Booker decision, the United States Sentencing Commission
reported that despite it all-the years of political warfare on sentencing, the adoption of the
Feeney Amendment, the chaos in federal court caused by the Blakely decision, the Supreme
Court's "last" word in the Booker and then the Kimbrough and Gall cases-not as much has
changed in federal sentencing as we might have expected. With all the pre-Feeney hype
about downward departures and the leniency of the judiciary, one might have anticipated a
federal judiciary run amok handing out light sentences to hardened criminals under a purely
advisory system. That nightmare never materialized. There is an increase in sentencing
outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and this increase has continued to rise as the
Court cements its ruling and district judges receive the message. Moreover, there has been
even more of an increase in disparity between judicial districts. Federal judges have heard
but not overreacted to the Court's grant of discretion, and AUSAs in the field offices have
realized that Main Justice cannot control their plea negotiations and sentencing hearings.
While there is a greater and greater tendency over the last few years to sentence below
the federal sentencing guideline range, the majority of federal cases continue to be sentenced
within the Guidelines. As far as non-govemment sponsored (not for substantial assistance,
fast-track program, or any other government requested reason) downward departures, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission reported in 2006 that the rate increased from 8.6 percent pre-
Feeney Amendment to 12.5 percent post-Booker. The increase for below-Guidelines
sentences not requested by the government is slightly higher if we limit our post-Booker
158. Id. at 720 (Scalia, Souter, Thomas, JJ. & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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comparison to sentencing decisions after the Feeney Amendment constrained federal district
judges even further-the percentage increased from 6.3 to 12.5 percent. 159  The
Commission's latest report, which includes cases sentenced post-Kimbrough and Gall
(2007-08), indicates yet another increase in non-government sponsored downward
departures, this time to 13.1 percent. 160 We believe that these figures may also not tell the
whole story, as the percentage of government sponsored below range sentences for
substantial assistance and early disposition is also increasing, as is a category called "other
government sponsored below range" sentences.
16 1
In addition to its obvious description of enhanced judicial discretion, these figures also
tell us that Main Justice is losing its grip on line prosecutors in the field and that these line-
prosecutors are more apt to agree to below guideline sentences suggested by their local
district judge or defense bar. This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that most of
the variation among Circuits and from district to district is caused by government-sponsored
departures, not downward departures suggested by the defense bar or the judge and opposed
by the government. 162  This tells us that line-prosecutors in different U.S. Attorney's
Offices are not toeing the party line that Main Justice is attempting to impose.
Why didn't Booker unleash the judiciary to impose reduced sentences more often?
Although the Supreme Court made the Guidelines advisory, they did not make them
irrelevant. Judges are still required to calculate and consider the Guidelines sentencing
range and explain in writing any decision not to impose the guideline range. So the
guideline range is necessarily the starting point in every judge's decision making-it serves
as a mental anchor, it creates a shared vocabulary that structures all sentencing decisions.
The appellate courts have insulated sentences within the Guidelines range from reversal, and
the Supreme Court has blessed this in Rita by allowing an appellate "presumption of
reasonableness" for within-guideline sentences only. Although a departure decision up or
down is much less likely to be reversed post-Booker, even where the departure is motivated
by the judge's own policy disagreement with the Commission, any departure decision still
leaves the judge vulnerable to the possibility of reversal, which every judge avoids. Finally,
many federal judges on the bench today were appointed after 1984, which means they have
known no system but the Guidelines. We are all infected by the normative power of the
actual. 163 In short, after Booker, Kimbrough, Gall, and Spears, the Guidelines still carry the
day in the majority of federal sentences, and, while departures from guideline sentences will
probably continue to increase, the rate of these departures is unlikely to change radically
under current law.
159. U.S. Senten. Commn., supra n. Ill, at 73, 77.
160. U.S. Senten. Commn., Latest Post-Booker Sentencing Data, 21 Fed. Senten. Rep. 39, 40 (2008) (Table 1,
including about 40,000 cases sentenced from Dec. 10, 2007 to June 30, 2008). The Commission also reported in
2006 that the rate of above-range sentences doubled from the pre-Feeney period, although even that figure was only
1.6 percent. That figure has not increased at all in the 2008 data, confirming that federal judges did not believe that
sentences were too low.
161. Other Government-sponsored below range sentences increased from 3.2 percent after Booker to 4.0 percent
after Kimbrough/Gall. Id. at 30.
162. See U.S.Senten. Commn , US. Sentencing Commission Post-Kimbrough/Gall Data Report (2008).
163. But see Model Penal Code: Sentencing 115 n. 161 (citing Stith & Cabranes, supra n. 19) (documenting the
"spectacular unpopularity" of the federal guidelines among most U.S. District Court judges during the decade after
enactment).
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What's more, the DOJ's characterization of the judiciary as too lenient and in need of
constraining has been proved to be untrue.164 The trend, pre and post-Booker, continues to
be higher and higher sentences. Why, one might ask, are sentences inching upward in our
new discretionary regime, from 56 months prior to the Feeney Amendment to 58 months
post-Booker? The Commission's explanation is that this slight rise is attributable to the rise
in presumptive sentences under the Guidelines, an increase in prosecutions for more serious
offenses, and a stiffening of penalties in pre-existing and new federal statutes, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and various terrorism legislation. 16 5 Perhaps judges took Congress's
criticism of their leniency to heart. Who knows? Sometimes the world of federal
sentencing is just a mystery.
164. The United States has 2.3 million criminals behind bars, with China, which has four times more population,
a distant second with 1.6 million prisoners. We hold 751 people in prison per 100,000 of our population, Germany's
rate is 88, and Japan's is 63. Most scholars attribute this gap at least in part to harsher U.S. sentencing laws. Adam
Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations', N.Y. Times Al (Apr. 23, 2008).
165. U.S. Senten. Commn., supra n. 11l, at 73.
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